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Abstract
InfiniBand is a popular Input/Output interconnect technology used in High Per-
formance Computing clusters. It is employed in over a quarter of the world’s 500
fastest computer systems. Although it was created to provide extremely low network
latency with a high Quality of Service, the cybersecurity aspects of InfiniBand have
yet to be thoroughly investigated. The InfiniBand Architecture was designed as a
data center technology, logically separated from the Internet, so defensive mecha-
nisms such as packet encryption were not implemented. Cyber communities do not
appear to have taken an interest in InfiniBand, but that is likely to change as attack-
ers branch out from traditional computing devices. This thesis considers the security
implications of InfiniBand features and constructs a framework for conducting Cyber
Vulnerability Assessments. Several attack primitives are tested and analyzed. Fi-
nally, new cyber tools and security devices for InfiniBand are proposed, and changes
to existing products are recommended.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENTS OF INFINIBAND NETWORKS
I. Introduction
The cyber threat landscape is continually evolving as attackers target new types of
networks, devices, and applications. According to Symantec’s 2018 Internet Security
Threat Report, the number of new mobile malware variants increased by 54 percent
in 2017, as compared to 2016 [1]. Much more alarming was the 600% increase in
attacks against Internet of Things (IoT) devices. These numbers illuminate recent
cyber trends, but primarily include less sophisticated actors targeting individuals and
smaller businesses. In 1998, Post and Kagan concluded that anti-virus software was
generally “effective at preventing the spread of viruses” [2], but modern experts agree
that it usually only catches older and less stealthy malicious files [3].
Relatively little is known about the activities of more advanced cyber threats
such as larger criminal organizations, hacktivists, and nation state supported intelli-
gence and hacking groups. Top tier actors are using traditional malware less and less,
because repeated use of the same or similar strains cannot be trusted to work if a
victim or outside security researcher locates any code fragments left behind. Further-
more, the most glaring vulnerabilities in commercially available operating systems
and applications have already been patched. This is why secret knowledge about
a previously undiscovered vulnerability, a so-called zero day exploit, is so valuable.
These can be sold on the black market for hundreds of thousands of dollars each, but
more importantly they can give a well-financed buyer a weapon for which there is
probably no defense [4].
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Despite the lack of documentation on advanced cyber actors, it must be assumed
that they are building capabilities against networks designated by the United States
Department of Homeland Security as belonging to one of the 16 critical infrastruc-
ture sectors [5]. Information Technology (IT) professionals and cyber defenders have
often relied on signature-based detection methods to notify them about anomalous
and potentially malicious activities within their networks, but this approach cedes the
initiative to the attacker and relegates the defender to a reactive position. Syman-
tec’s findings suggest the need for more proactive measures throughout the computer
industry as a whole. Cybersecurity experts must explore and evaluate all of their
computing equipment in novel ways, including from an outsider’s perspective.
It is unreasonable to expect network engineers and programmers to have the tal-
ent, time, or funding to compete with elite computer hackers, especially those with
the backing of a nation state or a large criminal organization. As a result, much of
the onus falls on the research community to investigate and test the cyber hardening
and resiliency of computing processing entities which were not previously thought of
as such. Examples of these include mobile devices, the IoT, Industrial Control Sys-
tem (ICS) networks, and embedded devices communicating over vehicular networks.
Non-traditional computing devices such as these do not usually have active traffic
monitoring in place, much less an actual human periodically viewing logs and alerts.
These types of equipment were not designed with cyber security as a primary feature.
Instead, they were built for user convenience, durability (availability of services), and
profitability. Despite these inherent challenges, a small amount of cyber hardening
can greatly increase the cost to the attacker and reduce the overall likelihood of a
successful cyber attack.
This thesis will focus on a niche computing market, specifically the portion of
the high-performance computing (HPC) community using InfiniBand, which is an
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Input/Output interconnect technology. As with the systems mentioned earlier, In-
finiBand equipment has not been subjected to thorough, external security testing,
because it has not been considered a likely target of hackers. InfiniBand designers
recognized the need for hardening and resiliency, and they wanted to improve upon
some of the fundamental weaknesses of Ethernet. High-speed networking hardware is
very expensive, so InfiniBand customers rightfully expect that their equipment will
not be easily compromised by attacks of relatively low sophistication (so called “script
kiddy” level). According to the November 2018 update to the TOP500 list, InfiniBand
equipment empowers 27% of the 500 most powerful computer systems in the world
but accounts for 37.4% of their total performance (see Figures 1 and 2 below) [6].
So, InfiniBand manufacturers have much to lose in terms of reputation and finances
should a newsworthy cyber attack on an InfiniBand network occur.
Figure 1. TOP500 Computer Systems
The desire to put such concerns to rest can be seen in a Mellanox white paper
entitled “Security in Mellanox Technologies InfiniBand Fabrics” [7]. It is part of the
motivation behind this thesis. The document provides a security review of InfiniBand
protocols and also highlights certain Mellanox Technologies products offerings. A
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company forum is necessarily biased, so it is worthwhile to provide an alternate
viewpoint. This thesis seeks to explore InfiniBand security features and implications
even further.
Figure 2. TOP500 List Statistics
Little published research tackles the question of how to defend HPC systems in
general. This has not been a priority, because these networks have not been consid-
ered to be at significant risk due to being in isolated enclaves. No model exists for
evaluating the cyber posture of an InfiniBand network. This thesis describes essential
elements of a meaningful Cyber Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) of InfiniBand and
how one could or should be performed. Basic attack primitives are tested and ana-
lyzed, and threats to InfiniBand systems are considered. Lastly, this thesis proposes
creating certain cyber tools and devices as well as improving current ones in order to
bolster network defenses.
These topics were generated as a result of the following research questions:
• What, if any, cybersecurity concerns are inherent to the InfiniBand specifica-
tion?
• What security features does (the) InfiniBand (protocol, architecture, hardware,
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software) have? Are they effective?
• How should one defend an InfiniBand network differently from how traditional
IT networks are defended?
• How could the overall security of an InfiniBand network be evaluated and then
improved upon? What skillsets and equipment would be needed to perform this
evaluation?
The structure of the thesis as follows: the background is discussed in Chapter 2;
Chapter 3 covers the methodology behind an InfiniBand CVA and of various attack
primitives; the CVA framework is detailed in Chapter 4 along with the results of
individual attacks; Chapter 5 proposes cyber tools and mitigations for the InfiniBand
Architecture; and, finally, the conclusion and future work round out Chapter 6.
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II. Background
This chapter will describe the InfiniBand Architecture and how its components
interact with each other. Current and potential employment of InfiniBand equipment
will be explored to understand what information these networks are processing and
what about them might attract cyber attackers. The next section will delve into
security aspects of InfiniBand, which is the focus of this thesis. This will lead into a
discussion about how cybersecurity evaluations are performed.
2.1 InfiniBand
InfiniBand is a network protocol comparable to Ethernet. It is extremely lightweight,
designed to minimize latency. In the late 1990s, the computer industry recognized
that it was facing a tremendous hurdle. Processor speeds were continuing to increase
according to Moore’s Law, but memory latency and network bandwidth limitations
were continually nullifying processor performance gains. For the average user, this
was not much of a problem. But for high-end servers, especially those operating in
clusters, a faster networking solution was needed. The networking (Gigabit Ethernet)
and storage (Fibre Channel) cards in a single system were pushing bandwidth limits
of motherboard buses and networking cables [8]. The InfiniBand Trade Association
(IBTA) was formed to find solutions to such obstacles.
Over 180 companies assembled in August 1999 to develop the InfiniBand Ar-
chitecture (IBA). IBM and Intel were the co-chairs of the IBTA, and the Steering
Committee included influential companies such as Dell, Compaq, HP, Microsoft, and
Sun. With differing needs from many contributors, the IBTA had to design a flexible
system. Their specification had to “scale down to cost-effective small server systems as
well as scaling up to large, highly robust, enterprise-class facilities” and had to allow
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for “new invention and vendor differentiation” [9]. The Association was not striving
to construct the most secure networks but rather to ensure the lowest latency and
highest application performance [10].
Unlike InfiniBand, Ethernet and the Internet Protocol (IP) suite was not built with
such a singular purpose. Its creator, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), re-
alized the need for a layered protocol stack that could support many types of traffic.
As a result, hundreds of subordinate protocols now run over Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) and/or User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Many of these services have
been officially assigned virtual port numbers by the Internet Assigned Numbers Au-
thority, with ports 0 through 49151 utilized as either system or user ports [11]. This
traffic diversification, in addition to dynamic packet routing, makes the IP suite per-
fect for the volatile World Wide Web, but these features add complexity and limit
performance. InfiniBand, on the other hand, is optimized for high bandwidth and low
latency. The IBA simply considers data encapsulated within InfiniBand packets as
Upper Layer Protocols. InfiniBand is not a service-oriented interconnect technology,
so application layer bits are completely ignored during transit. This would not be the
case if deep packet inspection took place somewhere along the route, but InfiniBand
does not currently implement this capability.
Specialized equipment is needed to process and empower InfiniBand. Modern
InfiniBand hardware consists of individual copper or fiber cables capable of up to
200 Gb/s full bi-directional bandwidth, but the version 1.0 release was primarily
based on 2.5 Gigabit copper [12]. The basic copper link has four wires, comprising
a differential signaling pair for each direction. The original specification called for
several data rates: 1x, 4x, or 12x copper and 1x fiber [13]. Table 1 below shows the
current InfiniBand standards, highlighting two decades of growth.
While individuals may enjoy 200 Gigabit networking equipment, InfiniBand hard-
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Table 1. InfiniBand Bandwidth Specifications
InfiniBand Standard Acronym Line Rate Lines Total
Quad Data Rate QDR 10 Gb/s 4 40 Gb/s
Fourteen Data Rate FDR 14 Gb/s 4 56 Gb/s
Enhanced Data Rate EDR 25 Gb/s 4 100 Gb/s
High Data Rate HDR 50 Gb/s 4 200 Gb/s
ware was not intended for the general population. It is too specialized and is cost
prohibitive for individuals and smaller companies. InfiniBand was built primarily for
high-performance computing (HPC) clusters, logically isolated from the open Inter-
net. InfiniBand nodes are capable of communicating across the web, but the Internet
backbone could not likely run on InfiniBand due to features such as predetermined,
static routing. It is clear the IBTA was aware of this, because the “present IBA
Router specification does not cover the routing protocol nor the messages exchanged
between routers.” True routers are optional in InfiniBand networks, as InfiniBand
has been successfully utilized without routers in a production environment between
two distant clusters [14]. Nonetheless, the fundamental nature of InfiniBand is that
of a data center technology not typically deployed in a network’s Demilitarized Zone
unless firewalls or other similar access controlled layers are placed in front of the
InfiniBand fabric [7].
This logical segregation provides a fair amount of security, but it is not hard to
imagine that driven cyber actors would want to gain access to the valuable data
stored within. However, communicating on an InfiniBand network is not a trivial
task, because most Windows and Linux applications were not written to be able to
run over InfiniBand, or at least to take advantage of its superior latencies. That begs
the question as to what types of customers the IBTA envisioned when it designed the
InfiniBand specification. Since this paper seeks to improve the defenses of InfiniBand
systems, it is important to understand what types of networks employ InfiniBand
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equipment. One cannot understand an attacker’s motives without appreciating the
value of that which is being protected.
2.1.1 Existing Deployment of InfiniBand Equipment.
The TOP500 list referenced in the Introduction gives us a decent sampling of
industries, government agencies, and other organizations that are currently using In-
finiBand equipment. The fastest systems on the list are predominantly government-
sponsored research organizations, but there are a surprising number of energy corpo-
rations and weather services (see Table 2) as well.
Table 2. TOP500 InfiniBand Usage by Customer Categories
Category Examples
Research/Academia
Department of Energy National Labs (US)
Forschungszentrum Juelich (Germany)
CEA/TGCC-GENCI (Curie supercomputer - France)
SciNet/University of Toronto (Canada)
Oil & Gas
Eni S.p.A. (Italy)
Total Exploration Production (France)
Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia)
Weather
China Meteorological Administration
Meteo France
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (US)
HPC, AI, & Cloud Computing
National Center for HPC (Taiwan)
Atos (France)
Inspur (China)
Social Media Facebook (US)
Health Care National Institutes of Health (US)
Manufacturing NVIDIA (US)
The common thread in these networks is the need for massive data processing.
Most of the research supercomputering clusters are closed systems, but that is not
likely the case with the energy and weather networks, for example. The latter re-
quire real-time inputs from atmospheric sensors, satellite imagery, and more, so these
cannot be air-gapped systems. As for the private companies, they probably setup
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their InfiniBand network segment(s) using the Industrial Control System (ICS) model
where the corporate (enterprise) network is connected to the control system network
through firewalls and/or Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections [15]. Several
reasons for this include the need for billing and usage monitoring, remote supervision,
as well as engineering and 3rd party access.
The level of remote connectivity to a computer system is critical from a cyberse-
curity perspective, because it determines how an attacker might gain access to the
system. Almost no computer is truly isolated, since new software and updates must
get installed somehow. Nonetheless, closed networks may necessitate physical access
in the form of a compact disk or flash memory device brought in by a malicious insider
or unknowing victim, as evidenced by the now infamous Stuxnet worm that made the
public aware of this type of attack vector. Another option is to merely connect to the
Internet occasionally when updates or other periodic transmissions are needed.
The next question to consider from a defender’s standpoint is what data may
be processed in these InfiniBand networks that might be of interest to hackers and
criminal organizations. Research and development advances and trade secrets may be
valuable, so espionage is a definite threat to the confidentiality of the data. Google,
Facebook, and financial institutions require ultra low latency for search queries and
transactions, but the retrieved data is usually far less valuable than the algorithms
that enable these systems. Another possibility is that cyber actors might want to
commandeer a HPC network in order to harness its computational power, such as
for digital currency mining, other cryptographic attacks, or for a complex algorithm
requiring parallel computing. Use as simple attack bots seems very unlikely due to
the level of effort and sophistication required to gain access to these supercomputing
networks. Lastly, data integrity should be a concern, because competing companies
and adversarial nations might want to tamper or corrupt data for the sake of sabotage.
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2.1.2 Future Use Cases of InfiniBand.
The process of understanding stationary, terrestrial networks has been taking place
for many years now, but as we approach the year 2020, mobile platforms must be
considered and contemplated for all types of computing devices. The term vehicular
here is not being used to refer merely to automobiles, but rather to include all manned
and unmanned ground vehicles, naval vessels (surface and subsurface), aircraft, and
spacecraft as well. Most vehicular networks today employ basic bus structures with
bandwidths in the Megabit per second range. Two major examples are Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus and MIL-STD-1553. These network standards are collision
domains, meaning that only one node on the bus may transmit at any one time.
Besides the fact that this is an inefficient communications model, there is also limited
addressing available and a lack of private conversations since network traffic is seen
by all devices on the bus.
The reason these bus structures still exist in large numbers (other than cost and
simplicity of design) is that vehicles have not required a high bandwidth and low
latency intranetwork. However, an increasing number of technological devices, each
demanding more bandwidth, is being added to vehicles for the sake of safety and
improved comfort. Modern automobiles are also being equipped with communications
gear to connect them with vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), enabling vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications supported by
wireless access protocols such as IEEE 802.11p [16].
It is improbable that a relatively slow moving vehicle such as an automobile would
have the need for an ultra low latency, high bandwidth network inside. Alternatively,
a jet aircraft or a large satellite, travelling at high speeds, might. One reason for this
is that extremely accurate geolocation of signals requires precision timing. Signals
travelling at the speed of light move approximately 0.98 feet per nanosecond, so clock
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skew of even a few microseconds could cause significant inaccuracies. Furthermore,
taking more frequent data points usually results in a smaller Circular or Spherical
Error Probable, the two or three dimensional spatial region in which over 50% of
the points fall. Faster moving vehicles are able to capture distinct lines of bearing
much more often than their slower counterparts, but they require equipment capable
of performing the calculations.
Air and space vehicles increasingly have advanced sensors capable of receiving ra-
dio and cellular communications, full motion video, thermal information, meteorolog-
ical data, radar signals and returns, airborne data links, performing terrain mapping,
tracking other moving objects, and more. The fusion and processing of thousands
of inputs to produce a real-time, situational awareness display could necessitate a
networking solution such as InfiniBand. At a macro level, aircraft worldwide could
serve as a mesh collection network relaying through satellites, ground stations, and
fellow aircraft. This airborne network would be far grander and require much higher
bandwidth than VANETs.
A high-speed, vehicular network must be nearly autonomous, as configuration
changes or updates during operation are difficult. An exception might be satellites,
because they cannot be grounded for maintenance after launch and are easier to reach
via a directional antenna. The problem with granting remote access to a network en-
gineer or programmer is that this would also open the possibility for unintended
access. Wireless environments are prone to periods of poor reception as well, whether
it be due to a high noise floor, signal blockage, or jamming. Nonetheless, the pri-
mary threats to a mobile, HPC network would be insider personnel and supply chain
tampering. These topics will be discussed later.
The reasons an attacker might attempt to gain access to a high-speed, vehicular
network are similar to those listed in the previous section. Some differences are that
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vehicular networks are relatively small compared to data warehouses and enterprise
level systems, they do not have 24/7 availability, and an attacker would not likely
know the vehicle’s exact schedule, route, or orbit. The potential to hijack the vehicle
while in transit is worth mentioning, but the navigational controls should be logically,
if not physically, separated from the mission systems. These vehicles may contain a
treasure trove of data, but it is probably very perishable information. Governmen-
tal systems are the most likely targets, because the opportunity to obtain classified
government materials provides a large incentive for opposing military leaders.
2.1.3 InfiniBand Fundamentals.
At its core, InfiniBand is a computer networking protocol, but the term InfiniBand
has become overloaded. The InfiniBand Trade Association had to design a network
infrastructure around it in order to maximize the performance of InfiniBand systems.
The group decided to improve upon the typical hierarchical structure of switches
and routers used by Ethernet-based networks. InfiniBand employs a switched fabric
topology (see Figure 3), which is a partial mesh providing connection reliability for
Inter-Processor Communication systems by allowing multiple paths between systems.
Scalability is supported with fully hot swappable connections managed by a single
unit - the Subnet Manager [8]. InfiniBand hosts have network cards, equivalent to
Ethernet Network Interface Cards, called Host Channel Adapters (HCAs). HCAs
usually have at least two physical ports so that the node can be connected to two
or more InfiniBand switches simultaneously. It would be impractical to create a full
mesh by establishing direct links between all devices, but switched fabrics provide a
nice compromise by improving redundancy, load balancing, and routing speeds.
Ethernet networks use dynamic Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and routing
tables to determine how and where to send traffic based on link speeds and congestion.
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Figure 3. Switched Fabric Topology
InfiniBand switches do not make routing decisions themselves. Instead, all shortest
paths are calculated by the Subnet Manager (SM) during network initialization and
after configuration changes. The SM then pushes out forwarding tables to every
device in the subnet, including all compute nodes. There can be multiple Subnet
Managers running simultaneously but only one acting as the master. Each Channel
Adapter and switch has a Subnet Management Agent (SMA) that communicates
with the SM. The SM sets up and maintains every link within a subnet, performing
network discovery periodically.
As for the InfiniBand protocol, it is based on the 7-layer Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) model, just as the Internet Protocol stack is [17]. Layer 2 addressing is
done via a Local IDentifier (LID) that is dynamically assigned by the SM [14]. The
LID is a 16-bit value, so a single subnet can support up to 65k hosts. Media Access
Control (MAC) addresses used in Ethernet, by contrast, are burned into the network
card by the manufacturer. However, these can be easily changed in software. A sim-
ple command like ifconfig eth0 hw ether 02:01:02:03:04:08 will accomplish this
task on many Linux distributions. This is significant, because InfiniBand addresses
cannot be easily modified in such a manner. At Layer 3, InfiniBand locators are
called Global IDentifiers (GIDs). These are valid IPv6 addresses for the most part.
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The first half (that is, 64 of the 128 bits) of each GID is called the Global Unique
IDentifier (GUID). GUIDs are embedded in the HCA, although there is not just one
of them per network card as with MAC addresses; each HCA port has its own GUID.
Distinct port addressing helps enforce the static routing discussed previously.
InfiniBand does not use sockets or virtual ports like Ethernet networks do. In-
stead, InfiniBand connections are established between two endpoints via entities called
Queue Pairs (QPs). Each QP consists of a Send Queue and a Receive Queue, and
each QP represents one end of a channel. If an application requires more than one
connection, more QPs are created. A Send Queue and Receive Queue together are
referred to as a Work Queue (WQ). Work Queues may put the results of completed
Work Requests in an associated Completion Queue. This includes both successfully
completed requests and unsuccessfully completed requests. Completion Queues no-
tify applications about information regarding ended Work Requests (status, opcode,
size, source) [18]. The user may insert a completion notification routine to be invoked
when a new entry is added to a Completion Queue. This nomenclature lends itself to
viewing InfiniBand as a messenging service.
Keeping applications informed of network activity is especially vital considering
that InfiniBand has a major speed enhancing feature called Remote Direct Memory
Access (RDMA). RDMA permits transferring of data without interrupting either
processor. In order to avoid involving the Operating System, the applications at each
end of the channel must have instant access to QPs. This is accomplished by mapping
the QPs directly into each application’s virtual address space. Thus, the application
at each end of the connection has direct, virtual access to the channel connecting it
to the application (or storage) at the other end of the channel. This is the notion of
Channel Input/Output [19]. The fact that there is no extra copying of data (such as
to various levels of cache) is referred to as “zero copy” networking.
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Table 3. InfiniBand Transport Services
Class of Service Acronym State Responses Sent?
Reliable Connection RC Connection oriented Acknowledged
Reliable Datagram RD Multiplexed Acknowledged
Unreliable Connection UC Connection oriented Unacknowledged
Unreliable Datagram UD Connectionless Unacknowledged
Raw Datagram Connectionless Unacknowledged
InfiniBand offers stateful and stateless connection types similar to TCP and UDP,
but these are not as critical in InfiniBand. They are called Reliable Connection (RC)
and Unreliable Datagram (UD). The Unreliable Connection (UC), Reliable Datagram
(RD), Raw IPv6 Datagram, and Raw Ethertype Datagram transport mediums exist
as well, although these are not as mainstream. Table 3 summarizes the transport
options. In Ethernet networks, most higher level protocols run over TCP to guarantee
100% packet delivery. Only trivial traffic that can be easily resent (e.g. domain
name queries) or that requires high speeds (i.e. streaming video) runs over UDP.
Conversely, UD is extremely common in InfiniBand. InfiniBand is more efficient at
avoiding congestion due to its Priority-based Flow Control. The Ethernet Pause
frame “stops all traffic indiscriminately” whereas InfiniBand “strictly avoids packet
loss by employing link-by-link flow control, which prevents a data packet from being
sent from one end of a link if there is insufficient space to receive the packet at the
other end of that link” [14]. More importantly, the InfiniBand receiver HCA drops
all out-of-order packets as that is an error condition as far as the InfiniBand receiver
is concerned. (This is a setting that can be changed, but the default is to disallow
out-of-order delivery.)
The ‘reliable’ connection types (RC and RD) send acknowledgements after ev-
ery transmission. Possible responses are either a positive Acknowledge (Ack) or a
Negative Acknowledge (Nak). The latter message can be triggered under three con-
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ditions: a temporary Receiver Not Ready (RNR Nak), a Packet Sequence Number
(PSN) Sequence Error Nak, or a fatal Nak error code. The RC, UC, and RD classes
support RDMA and require unique Queue Pair Numbers (QPNs), meaning that no
two connections can share the same QPN simultaneously. Since there are no virtual
ports in InfiniBand, this is the primary way that connections can be distinguished
from each other. Conversely, UD QPs use the same QPN, because they can send
to and receive messages from any other UD QP using either unicast (one to one) or
multicast (one to many). In addition to RDMA reads and writes, atomic extensions
to the RDMA operations also exist. These are essentially a combined write and read
RDMA, carrying the data involved as immediate data [9]. See Table 4 for a detailed
listing of available QP operations by connection type.
Table 4. Queue Pair Operations
Operation UD UC RD RC
Send (with immediate) X X X X
Receive X X X X
RDMA Write (with immediate) X X X
RDMA Read X X
Atomic: Fetch and Add X X
Atomic: Compare and Swap X X
Maximum message size MTU 1GB 1GB 1GB
RDMA has become popular due to InfiniBand, but it has been used in other I/O
interconnects. The reason for its success is that RDMA enables high-throughput,
low-latency networking with low CPU utilization. These advantages make it espe-
cially useful in massively parallel compute clusters. RDMA over Converged Ethernet
(RoCE) and the Internet Wide Area RDMA Protocol (iWARP) now bring a similar
capability to networks employing Ethernet-based software. The main difference be-
tween the two is that iWARP uses a “complex mix of layers, including DDP (Direct
Data Placement), a tweak known as MPA (Marker PDU Aligned framing), and a
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separate RDMA protocol to deliver RDMA services over TCP/IP,” whereas RoCE
operates “over standard Layer 2 and Layer 3 Ethernet switches” [20]. RoCE’s superior
performance metrics compared to iWARP have made it the market front runner.
Likewise, InfiniBand products (by Mellanox, at least) support Ethernet applica-
tions by offering Internet Protocol over InfiniBand (IPoIB) and Ethernet over Infini-
Band (EoIB) services. IPoIB uses an Upper Layer Protocol (that is, application layer)
driver that allows it to encapsulate IP datagrams over an InfiniBand Connected or
Datagram transport service. EoIB is akin to IPoIB except that it includes the (Layer
2) Ethernet header and only runs over UD. EoIB performs an address translation
from Ethernet layer 2 MAC addresses (48 bits long) to InfiniBand Layer 2 addresses
made of LID/GID and QPN, whereas IPoIB exposes a 20 byte hardware address
to the OS [21]. Because of this, EoIB requires additional equipment, specifically
a BridgeX gateway that can connect an InfiniBand fabric to its ‘external’ side, an
Ethernet network segment. This may be why EoIB is apparently being phased out,
as evidenced by the fact that it is not even mentioned in the latest version of the
Mellanox OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED) Linux User’s Manual (to be
explained later). The Ethernet Tunneling over IPoIB (eIPoIB) driver seems to have
replaced this functionality.
2.2 InfiniBand Security Features
The InfiniBand Architecture provides isolation and protection services using keys.
Keys are “values assigned by an administrative entity that are used in messages in
order to authenticate that the initiator of a request is an authorized requester and that
the initiator has the appropriate privileges for the request being made” [22]. There are
five types of InfiniBand keys: Management Keys (M_Key), Baseboard Management
Keys (B_Key), Partition Keys (P_Key), Queue Keys (Q_Key), and Memory Keys
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(L_Key and R_Key). A Partition Key designates a network partition to which a
Channel Adapter port belongs. Each port is assigned at least one P_Key by the
Subnet Manager, and these values point to entries within the port’s partition key
table. InfiniBand partitions are equivalent to Ethernet Virtual Local Area Networks
(VLANs), so P_Keys are like VLAN tags. Memory keys are needed for RDMA
operations and come in the form of local keys, L_Keys, and remote keys, R_Keys.
System memory is registered to bestow access to local and remote CAs. Registration
returns a pair of keys, which each have associated access permissions (i.e. read-only
versus read-write) [23]. The same memory buffer can be registered several times, even
with different permissions, and every registration results in a different set of keys.
Queue Keys are preshared keys that are used in the datagram connection types
(RD and UD). Prior to establishing a connection, CAs exchange Q_Keys between
QPs. Receipt of a packet with a different Q_Key than the one provided to the
remote QP indicates that the packet is not valid, hence it is rejected. Management
and Baseboard Management keys enforce control of the master Subnet Manager and
of the subnet Baseboard Manager, respectively. The Baseboard Manager component
communicates with nodes to provide an in-band mechanism for managing chassis [22].
The Baseboard Manager’s purview covers topics such as retrieval of vital product data
(e.g. serial number, manufacturing information), environmental data, and adjusting
power and cooling resources [24]. The Baseboard Manager communicates with a
Baseboard Management Agent (BMA) on each node, just as the SM does so with
every SMA. Every CA port and each switch have an M_Key and a B_Key. These
values do not need to be identical across all devices, but they must match what the
destination is expecting in order to verify that the source of a management packet is
the correct one.
InfiniBand also provides integrity and quality of service (QoS). Integrity is ensured
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by two checksums called Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRCs). As the name implies,
the 16-bit Variant Cyclic Redundancy Check (VCRC) is recalculated at each hop.
The 32-bit Invariant Cyclic Redundancy Check (ICRC) complements the VCRC by
protecting the fields that do not change along the communications pathway. Each
packet has a VCRC and an ICRC, and per block CRCs exist as well for each memory
block sent in the payload. As for QoS, packets are assigned a priority value between 0
to 15, called their Service Level (SL). (This is equivalent to the differentiated services
code point (DSCP) field in Ethernet.) Its SL factors into which Virtual Lane (VL) a
packet will transit through. Each physical link can support up to 16 VLs, with VL
15 solely for management packets. Service Levels stay constant throughout a subnet,
but a packet can change Virtual Lanes at each hop depending on SL to VL mapping
tables [25].
InfiniBand management is performed in-band, using Management Datagrams (MADs),
which are UDs with a maximum transmission unit (MTU) as low as 256 bytes. Some
MADs are called Subnet Management Packets (SMPs); these are unique in several
ways. In addition to transiting in VL 15, they are always sent and received on Queue
Pair 0 of each port and can use directed routing [9]. Directed routing occurs when a
Subnet Management Packet tells a switch which ports to send it on. This is necessary
when forwarding tables have not yet been initialized.
InfiniBand software derives from the OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED)
suite from the OpenFabrics Alliance, a collaborative development by major high per-
formance I/O vendors. Mellanox augmented this package in order to create its own
version of OFED. It supports both InfiniBand and Ethernet (technically, RoCE),
although many network cards cannot process both interconnect types [26]. OFED
includes custom diagnostic tools for network users and maintainers to ascertain the
status of the fabric. Two such utilities are ibstat and ibdump, which are analogous
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to the traditional Linux ifconfig and tcpdump, respectively. These OFED tools will
be covered individually in a later chapter. OFED also includes open-source software
called OpenSM, which brings Subnet Manager functionality.
As for writing InfiniBand-supported applications, that is done via a series of func-
tions called ‘verbs.’ The InfiniBand Architecture “contains no APIs, defined registers,
etc. Instead it is specified as a collection of verbs – abstract representations of the
function that must be present, but may be implemented with any combination and
organization of hardware, firmware, and software” [9]. For instance, the IBA stan-
dard does not specify how a queue should be implemented internally in the HCA
hardware. Each manufacturer must provide a driver as part of the OFA Verbs API
whose input will be function calls and data structures that are defined in great detail
by the API. Due to latency requirements, Mellanox programming is accomplished in
the C language according to their “RDMA Aware Networks Programming User Man-
ual.” A few example verbs/functions are ibv_get_device_list(), ibv_reg_mr()
to register a memory region, and ibv_create_qp() to create a queue pair. Table 5
contrasts some features of Ethernet and InfiniBand.
Table 5. Ethernet vs InfiniBand
Feature Ethernet InfiniBand
Host adapter Network Interface Card (NIC) Host Channel Adapter (HCA)
Programming model Sockets Verbs
Layer 2 addressing
Media Access Control (MAC) Local IDentifier (LID)
address statically assigned dynamically assigned by
by NIC manufacturer Subnet Manager (SM)
Layer 3 addressing
Global IDentifier (GID): 64-bit subnet
Internet Protocol (IP) ID assigned by SM plus 64-bit
address Global Unique IDentifier (GUID)
assigned by HCA manufacturer
Forwarding tables Distributed control; each switch Centralized control via SMdiscovers neighbors independently
Packet capture Use standard operating system capture Use a vendor-specific tool suchtools, such as Wireshark or tcpdump as ibdump from Mellanox
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A less InfiniBand-specific way to write network applications is through the Mes-
sage Passing Interface (MPI). MPI is a library specification that enables the devel-
opment of parallel software to utilize parallel computers, clusters, and heterogeneous
networks [21]. Mellanox’s version of OFED includes Open MPI, which is an open
source implementation by The Open MPI Project. Open MPI supports numerous
interconnect types including InfiniBand/RoCE/iWARP verbs, TCP sockets, Shared
memory, and more. As a result, it provides HPC programmers and users an easy
way to migrate software between varied networks. Programming can be done in C
or Fortran, although native Microsoft Windows support has been removed; use of
Cygwin is required [27].
2.3 Standard Information Technology Protections
The process of hardening and defending a new type of system is often challenging,
so it is wise to consider current protective measures for similar systems. Computer
network defense of IP-based networks has been evolving for nearly three decades, so it
is an established discipline. Before attempting to come up with innovative solutions,
this thesis seeks to evaluate whether traditional Information Technology (IT) security
tenets and devices can be applied to InfiniBand networks.
The most fundamental of IT security principles is the Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability (CIA) triad. Confidentiality revolves around the concept of ‘least
privilege,’ which asserts that access to information and assets should only be granted
on a need to know basis so that information that is only available to some should not
be accessible by everyone. This is seemingly at odds with availability, but it is not.
Availability calls for systems and services to be running and operating properly when
needed. This implies that disasters should degrade system performance and main-
tenance actions should interfere with uptime to the least extent possible. Networks
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should be designed to be fault tolerant and resilient. This can be achieved through
redundant systems such as software backups, power generators, hot/warm/cold sites,
etc. Lastly, integrity ensures that information in transit or at rest (i.e. in memory)
is not altered without permission of an owner or authorized user. An example of
integrity checking is a one way cryptographic hash of a file or data block that can be
calculated and then compared against at a later time [28].
Extending the notion of access control are the related principles of Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) plus non-repudiation. Authentication is the
act of confirming one’s identity, ascertaining whether or not someone is a legitimate
user. Authorization determines if an authenticated user has the necessary permissions
or privileges to perform a certain action. Accounting (also known as Accountability)
is associated with auditing and logging. It gives administrators the ability to track
the activities that users performed. Completing the circle is non-repudiation, which
proves that an event or action has taken place so that it can’t be repudiated (that is,
denied) later [29]. Digital signatures and timestamps are two pieces of information
that can be used as evidence, should the need arise.
These security principles are put into effect by cyber defense software and devices.
At the host level, the most common entity is anti-virus software. Anti-virus software
checks the local file system for malware signatures obtained by anti-virus companies
and security researchers. This is an effective way to share the findings of cybersecurity
experts worldwide, but the newest, most advanced malware strains usually avoid
detection. Part of the reason for this is that signature updates only occur periodically
(e.g. weekly), and APT-level actors tend not to release their best material for risk of
it getting caught. In addition, polymorphic code exists, mutating the source code of a
program while keeping the original algorithm intact. The desired effect is to prevent
exact signature matches once the code is recompiled.
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Other host level security measures include file verification (attestation) and ac-
count management. File verification compares the hashes of critical files against
known good versions. This ensures data integrity and can work in tandem with file
backups. An offshoot of checking known good files is to look for newly created files
that were not in the last system image. This can reveal unwanted material, although
operating systems and applications do generate legitimate temporary files, so false
positives could be numerous. Account management is the constant process of updat-
ing basic user and administrator accounts so that users have the correct privileges
established by policy and/or management. At the host level, this has to do with a
user’s ability to read, write, and execute individual files and folders. At the network
level, this entails allowing the user (or service) to interact with other devices.
Network security is often more difficult than that at the host level, especially in an
enterprise-scale network with widely heterogeneous data and/or with a large number
of approved ports, protocols, and services (PPS). The strictest way to limit network
traffic is with firewalls and Access Control Lists (ACLs). Application layer filtering
is possible with more modern firewalls, but traditional firewalls and ACL rules block
incoming or outgoing traffic on specific burbs/interfaces (physical ports) of a firewall,
switch, or router. Traffic is typically blocked or allowed based on the destination or
source address, port, protocol, or service. Similarly, proxy servers or proxies act as
application-level gateways between a local network and a larger-scale network such as
the Internet. They usually filter limited types of traffic, such as web pages or e-mail
content [30].
The network equivalent to anti-virus software is an Intrusion Detection/Prevention
System (IDS/IPS). These devices look for signatures in network traffic. The differ-
ence between the two is that an IDS will only send alerts based on signature matches
whereas an IPS will drop or reject individual packets or conversations. Anti-intrusion
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systems also tend not to be super effective, because hackers can use compression
and packing techniques to obfuscate their code over the wire. Network access con-
trol is handled by a AAA server running an authentication service such as RADIUS
or TACACS+ [31]. Microsoft Windows Server utilizes Active Directory which runs
LDAP and Kerberos, which are newer, more secure services [32].
A strong network defense combines multiple of the elements discussed in this
subchapter. Just as castles of old did not rely solely on moats or castle walls to repel
invaders, computer networks should not depend on only one defense mechanism.
Network architects used to believe that a firewall alone could prevent all unwanted
traffic from entering, but more recently the accepted train of thought is that talented
attackers can find a way in somehow and that defenders must utilize layered defenses
in order to make an adversary’s job as difficult as possible. This strategy is referred
to as Defense in Depth. The goal is that even if a hacker or piece of malware were
to gain access, that entity would not be able to gain administrative privileges or be
able to move around the internal network unchecked.
2.4 Previous InfiniBand Security Research
Warren from the SANS Institute presents a GUID spoofing attack, accomplished
by altering the values in firmware [33]. This is a significant contribution, but with
limited realism because the ‘victim’ machine, to which the actual GUID belonged, was
taken oﬄine prior to the attack. An attacker who compromises a single host would
not be able to shut down another host without first gaining access to it, thus negating
the benefit of spoofing its address. (The exception might be launching a successful
denial of service attack.) Nonetheless, this precaution led to a more straightforward
proof of concept experiment. In Ethernet networks, duplicate MAC addresses within
the same subnet can cause network instability. It is unclear how the Subnet Manager
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would react to a GUID change on a live network, since GUIDs are not supposed to
change, unlike LIDs or even GIDs.
In a white paper titled “Security in Mellanox Technologies InfiniBand Fabrics”,
Mellanox asserted that the InfiniBand Architecture “targets one of the main concerns
in such environments [a data center LAN] which is Security, and has many built in
mandatory features that enable much better isolation and security than current net-
works and other cluster interconnects” [7]. The paper emphasizes that InfiniBand is
a Layer 2 protocol much like Ethernet, so almost all Layer 3-7 security mechanisms
will work the same way with InfiniBand. Switch administration is done out-of-band
via management ports as opposed to many switches which can be remotely config-
ured. Their switches support Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
authentication, although it uses MD5 hashes which are now considered to be inse-
cure. Mellanox contends that hardware-based features such as packet construction
and GUID addressing significantly improve security by preventing “software applica-
tions to gain control over them and maliciously change those attributes.” The paper
claims that standard Layer 2 attacks such as MAC floods, gratuitous ARP, and VLAN
hopping are not possible in InfiniBand.
In contrast, Lee et al. from Texas A&M and the Intel Corporation believe that the
IBA specification has omitted security, resulting in potential vulnerabilities that could
be exploited with moderate effort [34]. The authors did not orchestrate a particular
attack themselves but base their argument on the lack of encryption in InfiniBand.
Lee et al. are concerned by the fact that powerful keys used for authentication and
management are sent over the wire in plaintext. The thought is that these keys could
be easily obtained from a traffic sniffer then spoofed to powerful effect. The authors
infer that having infiltrated an InfiniBand network, a hacker could abuse the extensive
computational power and massive storage capacity of the cluster, which could be “used
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for another attack and as a repository for illegal contents.” Even though their focus is
on data confidentiality, Lee et al. proposed a security enhancement to protect against
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. They built a simulation testbed with a stateful
partition enforcement mechanism in switches using trap messages. They wanted to
filter all types of packets with an invalid Partition Key.
2.5 Cyber Vulnerability Assessment
A Cyber Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) is an integral part of a good security
program. It is the process of identifying and analyzing security vulnerabilities that
might exist in a computer system. The term ‘system’ here usually refers to a network
or enterprise but can be an individual device or component. Vulnerability assessments
are typically conducted through “network-based or host-based methods, using auto-
mated scanning tools to conduct discovery, testing, analysis and reporting of systems
and vulnerabilities. Manual techniques can also be used to identify technical, physi-
cal and governance-based vulnerabilities” [35]. The reader may also be familiar with
related types of ‘assessments’ such as ethical hacking and penetration testing. The
finer distinctions between these will not be made in this thesis, but it is significant
to note that vulnerability assessments are not exploitative by nature, meaning that
“practitioners (or the tools they employ) will not typically exploit vulnerabilities they
find .. a suspected vulnerability does not typically need to be exploited to identify
its existence and apply a fix” (if known and available) [35].
Conducting a CVA consists of two main objectives, the planning and performing of
the vulnerability assessment. The planning portion is extremely important, because
it entails “gathering all relevant information, defining the scope of activities, defining
roles and responsibilities,” and more [36]. A CVA of a production network includes
interviewing system administrators and reviewing appropriate policies and procedures
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relating to the systems being assessed. These and other recommended actions will be
described later in this thesis, because our test network merely consists of a few Linux
hosts connected to a single switch. As a result, this is a technical assessment only.
The process of defining the assessment scope is almost always up to the customer
or network owner. It determines what entities are in play, but the execution strategy
is usually up to the assessor. Many cyber experts believe in looking from an attacker’s
perspective by employing the so called “hacker methodology.” This progression lists
the stages of a cyber attack from reconnaissance and enumeration to covering tracks
and exfiltration of data. Physical attacks are carried out in much the same manner,
and of course each type of attack does not necessarily incorporate every stage of
the progression. Some of the codified models include Lockheed Martin’s “Cyber Kill
Chain” [37], the MITRE Corporation’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common
Knowledge (ATT&CK) Matrix [38], and the STRIDE model by Praerit Garg and
Loren Kohnfelder at Microsoft [39]. (MITRE is a not-for-profit company that operates
multiple federally funded research and development centers.)
Lockheed’s Kill Chain started with a 2011 company white paper and is focused on
the concept of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). The authors define APTs as
“well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion campaigns
targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security information”
[37]. The acronym is further broken down such that Advanced denotes these actors
are targeted, coordinated, and purposeful, and Threat specifies person(s) with intent,
opportunity, and capability. The crux of Lockheed Martin’s approach is intelligence-
driven computer network defense, a risk management strategy that addresses the
threat component of risk, incorporating analysis of adversaries, their capabilities, ob-
jectives, doctrine and limitations. The Cyber Kill Chain stages are as follows: recon-
naissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control
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(C2), and actions on objectives.
As an aside, the phrase APT is also used by FireEye Inc. (formerly Mandiant)
to designate major cyber groups suspected of receiving direction and support from
an established nation state. Cyber attribution, the process of tracking, identify-
ing and laying blame on the perpetrator of a cyberattack, is extremely difficult to
do with complete accuracy due to attacker obfuscation techniques making the long
and painstaking process of performing computer forensics even more challenging.
Nonetheless, obtained code fragments and chatter within the hacking community can
provide valuable clues. FireEye has assigned names to various groups, such that APT
1 is associated with China, APT 29 aligned with Russia, and APT 33 with Iran, for
example [40].
The STRIDE model highlights types of cyber attacks, rather than their stages. It
is a mnemonic for security ‘threats’ in six categories:
Spoofing (of user identity)
Tampering
Repudiation
Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak)
Denial of service
E levation of privilege
This STRIDE model is a good albeit generic way to classify attacks, but it does
not delve into the progression of attacks nor does it investigate individual attacker
techniques.
That is the strength of MITRE’s framework. In addition, the ATT&CK Matrix
has been widely accepted within US governmental cyber communities, so we have
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chosen to adopt it in this thesis. The list begins with gaining initial access on a device.
All adversarial actions taken prior to establishing a foothold in the network are covered
by the PRE-ATT&CK Matrix. For the sake of our testing, the assumption was made
that a host or other device on a generic InfiniBand network could be compromised
somehow. The method or means by which that unintended access might be acquired
was not considered, because our setup is a closed network. However, Chapter 3 will
cover PRE-ATT&CK considerations.
The full ATT&CK Matrix includes techniques spanning Windows, macOS, and
Linux platforms. Many of these are OS dependent. InfiniBand is supported by newer
Windows distributions, but we will focus on Linux-style attacks, because Linux is
more prevalent in high-performance networks. No cyber attack model explicitly incor-
porates InfiniBand, so this thesis seeks to discover and document specific techniques
using the ATT&CK tactics as guidelines.
The 11 ATT&CK Matrix tactic categories, shown in Figure 4, are the column
headings of the table. They are as follows: Initial Access, Execution, Persistence,
Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Move-
ment, Collection, Exfiltration, and Command and Control (C2) [38].
Figure 4. MITRE Corporation Enterprise Tactics
These functions are typically performed in that order chronologically, although
attackers have their own tradecraft and preferences. The available time on target
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and required stealthiness can also influence the sequence of events. Execution is the
means by which the cyber effect is produced. Common options include a command
line interface (CLI), a graphical user interface (GUI), a script, or a compiled binary.
Persistence allows an attacker to quickly and/or easily regain access to that device
should the connection be severed for whatever reason. Privilege escalation means
increasing one’s level of access to files, directories, and programs. Ideally the attacker
would have full administrative rights such as being able to modify, add, or delete
anything on the file system. In Linux the default administrator is the ‘root’ account.
Defense evasion is bypassing security measures (i.e. anti-virus software, firewalls)
and avoiding detection. Credential access is the process of harvesting usernames,
passwords, Personal Identification Numbers, and even cryptographic keys. Discovery
is how the attacker learns what other systems are on the internal network. After that
is accomplished, the decision may be made to attempt to pivot to another device.
This is called Lateral Movement. Collection is assembling and staging the victim’s
data so that it can later be sent to a location of the attacker’s choosing. Lastly, C2
is how the attacker communicates with his or her malicious beacons and implants.
Cyber methodologies such the ATT&CKMatrix describe how a hacker perpetrates
a cyber attack. The next chapter of this thesis will cover how to harden a high-
performance network against attacks, specifically how to plan a CVA. InfiniBand
is a high bandwidth, low latency interconnect with many functions performed in
hardware instead of software. This presents additional challenges for both attackers
and defenders.
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III. Methodology
This chapter will lay the foundation for conducting a Cyber Vulnerability Assess-
ment (CVA) of InfiniBand. It will consider the motivations behind performing an
assessment, how one should be properly scoped, and what equipment and person-
nel would be necessary to evaluate a live, production InfiniBand network. Possible
sources of attack will be explored so that likely ingress points can be hardened prior
to the cyber defense team’s arrival. In parallel with this notional assessment, planned
attack primitives, which will be tested later on our small, laboratory network, will be
described at the end of the chapter.
3.1 Assessment Purpose and Scope
Establishing the purpose and scope of a CVA is not a trivial task, yet it is a critical
one. Performing vulnerability assessments on complex, high-performance computing
(HPC) systems is a difficult and costly operation, not only due to the equipment
involved but also for the necessary experience and expertise amongst members of the
assessment team. The customer’s motivation in hiring the team may drive much of the
planning effort. Sometimes organizational policy dictates having external (as in not
accomplished by employees), periodic assessments done, and other times leadership
wants to be reassured that their valuable systems are ‘safe.’ Ideally, impromptu
assessments would be initiated based on credible threat intelligence indicating that
cyber threat actors are targeting specific industries, companies, or types of networks
or that an intrusion was detected on a similar system. The reality is that this exists
only to a very generic extent, and larger organizations are often afraid to publicly
admit that their network was breached. Government agencies do not want to lose their
citizens’ trust and to embolden their enemies, whereas companies fear plummeting
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stock prices.
This lack of information sharing between organizations is harmful to the collective.
The power of anti-virus software, for example, is that a malware sample discovered by
Kaspersky researchers in Russia will likely result in the generation of virus definitions
that could protect a laptop computer in Brazil days later. Regardless, cyber threat
intelligence is not always accurate or up-to-date anyway. Peer network owners are
often not even aware that they were victims of an attack for months after the fact,
because more advanced adversaries are far better at avoiding detection than their less
sophisticated counterparts. So, cyber threat intelligence is an important resource, but
complete reliance on it is unwise.
Once the need to perform a CVA has been established, discussions between the
client and representatives from the assessment team will begin. At the macro level,
a management decision must be made as to whether to cover policy and procedures
only, to conduct a technical assessment, or both. A major factor in this decision is
whether the InfiniBand network is live and must have 24/7 availability. The network
owner may not allow assessors to bring in or connect their own equipment, but this is
preferred for several reasons. First, production machines have programs and processes
actively running on them. These processes may be using much of the system’s pro-
cessor and memory resources, so an assessor working on a live node could incidentally
cause a crash while performing his or her duties. Secondly, cyber teams occasionally
get contacted because of a suspected network intrusion or anomalous system behav-
ior. It is beneficial to both parties that one does not accidentally infect the other,
and the team must be fully confident that their tools have not been compromised.
Lastly, the team should (at least initially) be assigned their own subnet, partition or
Virtual Lane (VL) for logical segregation in order to limit network disruption and to
allow for pseudo-external testing.
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Penetration testing starting from outside the network’s perimeter or from a De-
militarized Zone (DMZ) is also a possibility, but this is usually not included in a CVA.
A penetration tester’s inability to gain access to an internal network within a limited
amount of time does not prove that it could not be done eventually or that it has
not been done previously. Keep in mind that Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
commonly perform reconnaissance on a target for months or years at a time.
Prioritization of effort in a CVA should be based on risk. Identify the assets and
define the risk and critical value for each device, based on the client’s input [41]. A
master Subnet Manager and a Windows Domain Controller are two examples of crit-
ical nodes, part of what the military cyber community refers to as key cyber terrain.
Non-essential nodes may be omitted from the assessment, time permitting, but it is
worth noting that attackers often choose such locations to establish persistence, pre-
cisely because they are not heavily defended or well monitored. Ethernet networks
commonly make use of automated vulnerability scanners such as Nessus by Tenable
Inc. [42]. It uses plugins to perform configuration audits, patch management, find
(known) software vulnerabilities, etc. A vulnerability scanner for InfiniBand does
not exist, but an IP-based scanner could be run if Internet Protocol over InfiniBand
(IPoIB) is enabled on the network.
Policy assessments review topics such as an organization’s asset management, ac-
cess control, user awareness and training, data security, maintenance procedures, as
well as response and recovery planning. This thesis is not an authoritative source
on Information Technology (IT) policy-related issues. Instead, it is recommended
that assessors create their own checklists based on the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework or another industry accepted
standard [43]. Many items will not apply, since these frameworks were written for
Ethernet networks, but they are solid models. Also be aware of industry-specific
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security guidelines and regulations such as the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) for
cloud service providers and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) IT Examination Handbook for the financial sector [35]. Sean Peisert wrote
a very insightful article for Communications of the ACM, detailing unique security
considerations for HPC environments [44]. These topics will be covered in Section
3.5.
Focus should always be on the customer’s mission. This must be well understood
so that the cyber team can tailor a solution in terms of the assessment duration,
facility access, work schedule, etc. The team should request as much information
about the network as possible ahead of time in order to identify potential network
susceptibilities and to formulate an assessment strategy. If the client consents to
giving the team copies of software used on their network, the team can setup a small,
prototype network on which to perform initial testing.
3.2 Equipment Setup
A prototype network was what the author used for this thesis. It is minimal
but allows for a technical CVA through experimentation with basic attack primi-
tives (see Section 3.6). The network consists of three desktop computers and one
Mellanox SX6012 switch. The switch has twelve ports, each capable of 56 Gb/s full
bi-directional bandwidth. It also has Ethernet, RS232, and Mini-USB management
ports for out-of-band maintenance [45]. The computers are high-performance desk-
top machines capable of handling the requirements of this assessment. They have
identical hardware and software. The only significant difference between the nodes is
that host #3 was chosen to be the Subnet Manager. As a result, it is running the
OpenSM program in master mode. In addition, host #3 is connected to the switch
via an RJ-45 to DB9 serial cable. This does not affect the normal in-band traffic,
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although it could provide an attacker a way to access the switch. Figure 5 shows the
actual equipment used.
Figure 5. AFIT InfiniBand Network
A production InfiniBand network will probably have dozens to thousands of nodes.
As previously mentioned, a cyber defense team should bring some of their own equip-
ment to the assessment. The customer may employ Windows, Linux, or a mix of
operating systems, so the team should be prepared for all eventualities. Likewise, the
Channel Adapters may be solely running InfiniBand or a combination of InfiniBand
and Ethernet (RoCE or iWARP), such as the Virtual Protocol Interconnect (VPI)
cards by Mellanox [18]. It is suggested that the team acquire CAs from a couple
different manufacturers for the sake of familiarity and in case of compatibility issues.
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Programs written using Message Passing Interface (MPI) should run on any Infini-
Band platform, but the verbs may be somewhat vendor-specific. InfiniBand verbs are
supplied by the Host Channel Adapter (HCA) driver [46].
As for the cyber team’s mobile kit, it should have at least two high-performance
PCs (depending on the size of the network), preferably mounted with removable solid
state drives. Several copper and fiber cables should be included, ideally EDR quality
or better. A forensics pack will be needed, containing spare, blank drives, write block-
ers, a disk cloner, as well as various connectors and adapters (e.g. NVMe/NVMHCIS,
SATA-to-IDE, FireWire).
Vehicular networks may have additional requirements. If cannon plugs or other
non-standard connectors are required to connect to these systems, they should be
provided by maintenance personnel. This topic must discussed in detail prior to
arriving at the vehicle’s location. Personal protective equipment will likely need to
worn while working on or near the vehicle. Additionally, physical access to individual
components may not be possible or might take much longer it would with traditional
server racks. These are but some of the planning considerations that should be
addressed for vehicular systems.
3.3 Team Composition/Required Skillsets
Assembling a cyber team with varied knowledge of HPC systems and advanced cy-
ber techniques will likely be difficult. Many disciplines are involved. Innovation is key,
because true cyber tools have not been written for InfiniBand. Popular information
security mainstays such as Nmap, Scapy, Metasploit, Nikto, Maltego, and Ettercap
do not support InfiniBand. All of them rely on crafting packets in software and/or
communicating with virtual ports. So, an assessment team would need to build their
own tools and scripts or at least develop capabilities to demonstrate system secu-
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rity weaknesses. Creativity is needed to find network susceptibilities using techniques
that are outside of traditional engineering methods and thought processes. Important
technical skills include: a deep and low-level understanding of hardware and software
design, ability to reverse engineer portions of hardware and software, an understand-
ing of various methods and strategies for exploiting systems, an understanding of
parallel and distributed systems, and an ability to create interfaces/simulations to
monitor and stimulate communications.
No single individual will possess all of these traits, but a talented group can. A
team of people from varied backgrounds should benefit from different thought pro-
cesses, skills, and experiences. A word of caution is warranted, though; InfiniBand
networking (and HPC clusters in general) is so fundamentally different from standard
Ethernet that all members should be familiar with the InfiniBand protocol and ar-
chitecture, as well as types of HPC applications. Hiring a cybersecurity professional
with no background in non-traditional computer systems could be disastrous, or at
least necessitate weeks to months of training and exposures before he or she is useful
to the team. As for programming skills, Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) and
MPI programming can be accomplished in C, so experts in that language are extra
valuable. Python, BASH, and Powershell scripting knowledge along with experience
using Windows and Linux operating systems are a must as well. (Linux is more
prevalent in HPC systems for obvious reasons.)
The OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED) software suite should be com-
mon to all InfiniBand equipment, but vendors make some of their own diagnostic
tools and all of their own hardware. Experience with equipment from different man-
ufacturers is useful, but this can be acquired on the job. InfiniBand HCA and switch
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are custom chips, so knowledge of
chip design and testing is needed. More important, though, is having a team mem-
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ber(s) with experience writing or modifying firmware.
3.4 Sources of Attacks
Defense in Depth is always the preferred method of protecting computer networks.
However, HPC systems tend to be flatter networks, making Defense in Depth more
difficult to implement. Adding more network hops and performing deep packet in-
spection increases latencies, a consequence that is deemed to be counterproductive.
Regardless, most HPC clusters are fairly closed networks, so the most critical step
for a defender is to prevent hackers from gaining initial access.
E-mail phishing attacks are the easiest and most common ways to gain a foothold
in traditional networks. Network engineers will be targeted by cyber actors, especially
if they leave their resume and contact information on hiring websites (e.g. Indeed.com,
LinkedIn, ZipRecruiter, CareerBuilder). Second to phishing-style attacks are vulner-
able websites that can be exploited by SQL injection, Cross-Site Scripting, input
validation, etc. Corporate networks will definitely be susceptible to these avenues,
but research LANs should not. Despite this, many supercomputer systems can be
reached remotely via an internal web interface (i.e. from within the campus network)
or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) Concentrator. Vehicular networks have
to consider a multitude of wireless signals and protocols.
Each network is unique, so there is no catch all solution. Network maintainers
must focus on how information gets in and out. The concept of “connected versus
connectable” applies to well segregated networks. Windows Update, anti-virus suites,
and Linux software installers (apt, yum, rpm, dpkg) make it easy for users to acquire
and update their operating system and programs, but these require an Internet con-
nection. Manual package downloading and installation are possible as well, but it is
imperative that the files are obtained from a proper website such that of the original
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equipment manufacturer or a trusted source like the OpenFabrics Alliance. Shared
repositories (i.e. GitHub) are very popular and widely used but are not ideal from a
security standpoint.
If files are downloaded manually, all corresponding cryptographic hashes (e.g.
MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) posted on the download page should be verified before any
files are installed. This is not a guarantee that the contents are safe as the website
could be compromised, and collision attacks have been successfully demonstrated on
the older algorithms, MD5 [47] and SHA-1 [48]. Removable media arriving through
the mail have similar concerns.
No network is completely closed off, so even janitorial staff, HVAC technicians,
and vehicle maintainers are potential threat vectors. Customers of expensive equip-
ment often pay for the service of having a representative from the manufacturer visit
regularly. All employees and visitors must be vetted (and preferably given badges)
prior to admittance in to the facility. Physical access is always the most powerful type,
especially because HPC nodes, as with Industrial Control System (ICS) hosts, are of-
ten left logged in when unattended or with a blank or default password. USB ports
can (and should) be disabled when not in use. Fortunately, autorun functionality is
not enabled by default anymore.
3.5 Assumptions & General Security Evaluation
Most of what has been discussed thus far in this chapter is applicable to many types
of computer systems and CVAs. But this thesis would not be a valuable contribution
to academia if it did not really emphasize why and how security concerns and potential
solutions for them are drastically different in HPC networks from those in typical
networks. The intent here is to dispel any assumptions the reader may have [44]:
1. HPC systems are optimized for high performance.
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This sounds like a feature that many networks should desire. However, security
is often at odds with performance, because the former wishes to add more
checks, restrictions, segregation, and complexity. The latter wants to improve
efficiency and remove all unnecessary delays.
2. HPC networks are usually designed to fulfill a singular purpose.
They are typically used for automated computation, commonly performing some
set of mathematical operations or running non-polynomial time algorithms. His-
torically, the purpose has been to do modeling and simulation, but data analysis
is becoming a more frequent task. Processing time on these systems is costly,
and jobs are scheduled in a queue. Downtime is seen as lost revenue or as missed
opportunities for research. By contrast, most traditional networks are general-
use. They provide various services. A user may want to access network storage
via SMB or FTP, send and receive e-mail traffic over SMTP/POP3/IMAP, con-
nect to another machine using RDP, SSH, or Telnet, or communicate with a
website using DNS and HTTP(S).
3. Users have a distinct interaction with HPC networks.
Most computer applications require constant, or at least regular, human inter-
action. They are often graphical user interfaces where aesthetics are valued.
HPC applications rarely involve extensive graphics. They run millions of sci-
entific calculations faster than a human can respond, so this is why scripts are
written and given a series of inputs and/or parameters. Programs usually do
not run on the local machine; they are initiated on a login node and sent to
compute nodes for execution. The user then waits for minutes to days for job
completion, after which time results can be retrieved through a data transfer
node (DTN). Figure 6 shows high-level workflow diagrams for different types of
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scientific computing.
Figure 6. Common HPC Workflows
HPC networks have other traits that distinguish them from traditional ones, but
this thesis is primarily concerned with the InfiniBand interconnect. Having clarified
some assumptions about HPC network usage, we will now investigate the security
implications of InfiniBand as a system. A general evaluation of InfiniBand security
must take a holistic approach, looking at its protocol, physical equipment (hardware),
supporting software, and network architecture.
3.5.1 InfiniBand Hardware Attacks.
Of these, hardware vulnerabilities are the most challenging for defenders, because
they are by far the most difficult to detect. InfiniBand switches and HCAs use custom
ASICs that are currently capable of sending and receiving data at rates up to 200
Gb/s per port. The newest Mellanox product lines are Quantum [49] and ConnectX-6
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[50], respectively. InfiniBand hardware is cost prohibitive for individuals and smaller
businesses, so these chipsets have not been externally tested or publicly vetted to
the same extent that more general purpose hardware (e.g. Intel i7 CPU) has been.
In addition, there has not been any published assembly language or microcode, and,
as a result, programmers and users must use vendor-specific tools and application
programming interfaces (APIs). So, if hardware vulnerabilities or backdoors were to
exist, they would be nearly impossible to come upon without any insider knowledge.
Reverse engineering a microchip begins with a very expensive and time consuming
physical process called delidding, progressively stripping off layers of the chip. Then
one can take photos of chip cross-sections using a scanning electron microscope [51].
Modern ASICs have over a billion transistors, so delidding one of these chips would
take a considerable amount of time. A far more likely threat to InfiniBand hardware
is supply chain tampering.
NIST lists cyber supply chain risks as “insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized
production, tampering, theft, insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as
poor manufacturing and development practices in the cyber supply chain” [52]. In the
case of InfiniBand or other HPC products, this would be an extremely sophisticated
attack, probably necessitating nation state level support. Malicious variants of the
ICs could be produced with an embedded rootkit or logic bomb. These could then
be substituted in for the original chips while the devices were in transit between the
manufacturer and the customer. The hope would be that the compromised devices
would find their way into facilities or onto networks otherwise out of reach of the
attacker. Testing for hardware vulnerabilities is such a complex operation that it will
not be discussed further in this thesis. However, firmware modification is much more
feasible, so it will be covered as an attack primitive later in this chapter.
A major security advantage of InfiniBand hardware is that packet crafting is done
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in the HCA, not in the CPU. Malformed packets cannot be tailored using software
with the way that HCAs are currently configured. Arbitrary metadata fields of a
packet cannot be altered without going through the vendor’s API. Possible excep-
tions to this are installing malicious firmware to reprogram the HCA and/or using
a different driver with a special set of verbs. Legitimate verbs check the validity
of inputs before creating a protection domain, registering a memory region, using a
hardware device, etc. A side effect of hardware packet crafting is that traffic sniffing
requires a custom tool (e.g. ibdump) instead of standard programs like tcpdump and
Wireshark. Without the ability to manipulate packets, attackers would not be able to
perform active man-in-the-middle attacks. Even if it were possible, software packet
crafting is much slower than doing so in hardware, so this might cause noticeable
network delays and congestion.
3.5.2 InfiniBand Architecture Evaluation.
The next portion of InfiniBand networking to evaluate is the architecture. The
switched fabric topology is not impervious to attack, but it does have advantages over
traditional switched networks. Having more than one physical connection to the rest
of the subnet provides redundancy and resiliency. If one link were to go down, that
endpoint should still be able to communicate through its other Channel Adapter port.
Espionage is more difficult to carry out and generally less successful when potential
routes between two endpoints do not share at least one common intermediate node.
Valuable intelligence can be gathered when a cyber actor performs traffic sniffing from
a Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) port on an Ethernet switch; all (or selected) traffic
traversing that switch is mirrored out a different port to the host the listener is on.
InfiniBand nodes are not always connected to just a single switch, so in theory only
a portion of the packets headed to or from a specific node would transit through the
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compromised switch. This depends on the shortest paths calculated by the Subnet
Manager (SM), resulting in forwarding tables unique to each node. Switched fabrics
cut down the attack surface by taking away the ability for switches to perform dynamic
routing. This is not really a security enhancement of the architecture itself but rather
the instantiation by InfiniBand. Ethernet attacks such as ARP cache poisoning and
routing table overflows are not possible because of InfiniBand predetermined routes.
Table 6 below summarizes some of the advantages of switched fabrics [8]. These
benefits are more pronounced when fabrics are compared to bus structures still used
in most vehicular networks.
Table 6. Switched Fabric vs. Bus Topology
Feature Fabric Bus
Topology Switched Shared Bus
Pin Count Low High
Number of Endpoints Many Few
Max Signal Length Kilometers Inches
Reliability High Low
Scalability High Very Limited
Fault Tolerance High Low
3.5.3 InfiniBand Protocol Features.
The InfiniBand protocol follows the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model as
previously discussed in Section 2.1. See Figure 7 for a visualization showing the layers
of encapsulation. The Local Route Header constitutes Layer 2, the Global Route
Header Layer 3, and Layer 4 consists of both the Base Transport Header and the
Extended Transport Header. The Local IDentifier (LID) as well as Service Level and
Virtual Lane information are in the Local Route Header. The Global Route Header
has the IP version and the Global IDentifier (GID), but this header is omitted entirely
during local (within a subnet) transmissions. The Packet Sequence Number (PSN)
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as well as queue, partition, and memory keys are all in the Layer 4 headers. The
fields in the Extended Transport Header differ based on the Base Transport Header
operation or the Local Route Header next header. The Invariant and Variant Cyclic
Redundancy Checks (ICRC and VCRC) are the respective checksums for bits that
do not change during the transmission and those that are recalculated at each hop.
Breaking the checksum up into two parts has the added benefit of making packets
slightly harder to spoof, were that easily accomplished. This also decreases the work
that switches have to do, thereby lowering transmission delay times.
Figure 7. IBA Data Packet Format
An obvious security concern of the InfiniBand protocol is the omission of data
encryption. InfiniBand packets are always sent in cleartext natively. Encrypting the
payload and possibly some of the metadata contained in the higher levels of encapsu-
lation (Protocol Data Unit headers) could improve data confidentiality. The IP stack
offers encryption down to Layer 3, in the form of Internet Protocol Security (IPsec),
but other common protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell
(SSH) operate at Layer 5 or above. The InfiniBand Trade Association (IBTA) chose
not to implement encryption, because it adds system complexity and is computa-
tionally expensive, significantly increasing network latencies. Technically, SSH is still
46
available if one enables IP over InfiniBand (see Section 2.1), but even this does not
hide the memory keys and other important keys since it only encrypts a portion of
the data (that is, the IP payload within the InfiniBand payload). Another dangerous,
albeit necessary, feature is forced routing. This could allow an attacker to ignore for-
warding tables and send a packet along any pathway they desired. Positive security
attributes include having Virtual Lanes, various keys (even if sent in the clear), and
unique Queue Pair Numbers.
3.5.4 InfiniBand Software Susceptibilities.
Lastly, we examine InfiniBand supporting software. OpenMPI and the OFED
suite are primary means for network users and programmers to interact with the
fabric. Both are open-source software projects, a fact that improves collaboration
and development within the HPC community. On the other hand, this aids would-
be attackers as well. OFED code could be modified relatively easily and recompiled
to create a new cyber weapon. A malicious variant might be extremely stealthy if
it maintained all or most of the functionality of the original code. OpenSM is one
such application ripe for exploitation, because it is a powerful tool that determines
all traffic routing within a subnet. Manufacturer scripts on the file system provide
another way to get acquainted with the inter workings of InfiniBand, especially con-
sidering that many hackers are not as adept in lower-level programming languages
like C and Fortran. (Knowledge of assembly language is critical for software reverse
engineering, so that is a different story.) InfiniBand diagnostic tools comprise the
majority of the OFED binaries. Binaries can be overwritten, fuzzed for input valida-
tion vulnerabilities, and/or brute forced by testing all command line (or graphical)
options.
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3.6 Planned Attack Primitives
This section will explain the types of cyber attacks that will be attempted later.
Some are feasible on Ethernet networks, so the intent here is to launch equivalent
attacks in InfiniBand. The particular vectors mentioned in this thesis have been
selected based on the authors’ previous experience and research, using the MITRE
Corporation’s ATT&CK Matrix as a guide. Of the 11 tactic categories from the
matrix, not all of them pertain to InfiniBand. Specifically, Initial Access, Persistence,
Privilege Escalation, and Defense Evasion involve methods particular to the Operating
System being employed.
3.6.1 Category: Execution.
Security researchers and the hacking community have created a multitude of cyber
tools for Ethernet networks. Very few if any of these would function in InfiniBand
due to hardware packet crafting, the lack of virtual ports, etc., without activating
IPoIB or EoIB. Using these Upper Layer Protocols is a legitimate technique, but this
paper does not consider InfiniBand “running in Ethernet mode.”
• OFED Diagnostic Tools
The diagnostic utilities in the OFED suite provide means to debug the con-
nectivity and status of InfiniBand devices in a fabric. Due to the lack of cus-
tom cybersecurity tools in InfiniBand, these utilities could provide the building
blocks for future cyber weapons, enabling an attacker to manipulate settings
and network traffic in unintended ways. Hackers with remote access are more
frequently “living off the land” instead of relying on malware to bring the de-
sired effect. Running standard operating system commands and using provided
diagnostic tools are much stealthier techniques compared to transferring and
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executing files not native to that environment. OFED tool usage should not set
off any alarms, nor does it put the attacker’s code at risk of being quarantined
or found.
All of the OFED diagnostic tools will be studied and tested. Individual packet
captures will be taken for each one to find out what network traffic is gener-
ated during execution. Not every possible combination of parameters will be
run. Instead, a few options that appear to have more dangerous or powerful
ramifications will be chosen and tested (e.g. ibping with the flood option).
• RDMA Programming
RDMA programming for IB, RoCE, and iWARP is accomplished via the verbs
API. Mellanox states that their architecture “permits direct user mode access to
the hardware” through a “dynamically loaded library” [18]. Networking experts
can program with verbs in order to customize and optimize the RDMA network
or to enable destructive actions. Anyone writing software for an InfiniBand
network will access the verbs or a cross-technology solution such as MPI. Custom
software will not be written for this thesis, but this potential attack vector is
still worth mentioning.
• Malicious Firmware Installation
Firmware is embedded code that programs a particular hardware device. In
this case, it is HCA (and possibly switch) firmware that is of interest. Repro-
gramming an InfiniBand HCA could allow an attacker to modify outgoing and
intercept incoming packets. Firmware is chipset-dependent, so no code modi-
fication would be guaranteed to work on all InfiniBand HCAs. This research
does not include firmware development but shows how malicious firmware could
be burned into a device.
49
3.6.2 Category: Credential Access.
InfiniBand does not use usernames and passwords for authentication, nor does
it require access tokens or tickets like Kerberos. Usernames and passwords are OS
mechanisms meant for human users, but HPC clusters usually run automated pro-
cesses. Instead, matching source addresses and keys grant communications access
between nodes. Administrative privileges are needed to run most InfiniBand tools.
• Address Spoofing
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) often block
traffic or generate alerts based on the source (MAC and/or IP) address. Mod-
ifying one’s source can allow an attacker to bypass these middleware devices.
Spoofing can cause the destination computer to grant elevated permissions if no
other authentication/authorization is in use. Address spoofing can also enable
‘reflected’ attacks, since any responses would be sent to the true owner of the
spoofed address. Popular ‘hacking’ tools such as Nmap and Scapy can easily
accomplish this attack:
nmap -S $IP_Address
ifconfig eth0 hw ether $MAC_Address
nmap –spoof-mac $MAC_Address
Address spoofing is an attack on data confidentiality, because it can allow an
unintended user or computer to gain access to otherwise denied resources. This
thesis will attempt to duplicate the GUID spoofing accomplished by Aron War-
ren in 2012 [33]. LID spoofing will be investigated as well.
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3.6.3 Category: Discovery.
A cyber actor can learn the addresses and structure of an internal network in
different ways. Typically, discovery is performed passively through traffic analysis
and/or actively through scanning. The former utilizes programs such as tcpdump
and Wireshark, whereas the latter involves tools like traceroute, Nmap, SolarWinds,
and many more.
• Network Traffic Sniffing
Traffic sniffing can give an attacker valuable situational awareness about a net-
work. It may not be thought of as an attack in and of itself, but it is an attack
on the confidentiality of the data. Just like in many forms of communication,
monitoring network traffic requires the perpetrator to be positioned between
the sender and the recipient unless he or she is only interested in conversations
involving one particular participant. The reason for this is that messages are
not always sent out to every device, unless the topology of the network is a
shared bus, or a network hub is used instead of a switch or router. Broadcast
and multicast messages exist in both Ethernet and InfiniBand, but these are
not ‘private’ messages. Therefore, switches tend to be the preferred target on
which to perform sniffing. Methods to perform InfiniBand traffic sniffing will
be explored in the next chapter.
• Network Mapping
The ideal byproduct of the discovery step is a complete and accurate network
map. Not every node communicates regularly, so passive monitoring may not
be sufficient; active scanning may be necessary to identify all connected devices.
Even during relatively idle times, Ethernet networks produce a lot of noise in the
form of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Network Time Protocol (NTP),
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and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) traffic, among others. In-
finiBand, on the other hand, has very little overhead. A network mapping tool,
especially one with a visual display, could provide InfiniBand users and main-
tainers with valuable situational awareness about their network. A few of the
OFED diagnostic tools deliver this functionality in text-only output form, so
this thesis will attempt to augment one or more of these tools with a graphical
interface.
3.6.4 Category: Lateral Movement.
Traditional pivoting is not necessary in an InfiniBand network, because remote
interactive logons are not used (again, excluding SSH via IPoIB). HPC clusters auto-
mate work using scripts, and nodes share resources. In a sense, hosts are extensions
of each other due to RDMA, far more so than file sharing via Server Message Block
(SMB) or File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
• Subnet Manager Hijacking
As previously discussed, the Subnet Manager is an extremely powerful entity
in InfiniBand networks, somewhat analogous to a Windows Domain Controller.
There must be one master Subnet Manager, but several other nodes can be
running in slave or standby mode. These backups perform some form of polling
(vendor specific) to ensure the master is operational, and failover to one of
them when it is not [9]. The OpenSM software is open source, so an attacker
could download the source code, modify and recompile it [53] [54]. Having
done so, the next step would be running a weaponized version of OpenSM on
the compromised machine and performing some kind of Denial of Service so
that the master Subnet Manager was unable to communicate, thereby getting
replaced as master.
52
Subnet Manager Hijacking could affect the integrity, confidentiality, and/or
availability of the network depending on the design and operation of a malicious
Subnet Manager. This thesis will not create a weaponized version of OpenSM
but will demonstrate how to cause the master Subnet Manager to fail remotely
so that another instance could take over.
• Out-of-Band Switch Access
In-band switch management is not possible in pure InfiniBand; switches do not
have a service that is listening for connection requests. Multi-interconnect sys-
tems such as Mellanox’s Virtual Protocol Interconnect (VPI) do not follow this
rule, because they can run Ethernet and InfiniBand simultaneously. As such,
they can allow SSH and HTTP(S) logins. The intended method of managing an
InfiniBand switch is by connecting a serial cable from a host to the switch’s man-
agement or console port. Then one can use HyperTerminal, minicom, PuTTY,
or another serial terminal program to receive a login prompt. One should follow
the configuration settings (e.g. baud rate) in the switch’s user manual, a copy
of which should be accessible online.
Unless an attacker has physical access to the switch, he or she cannot simply
bring in a laptop and connect it. A more plausible scenario would be that a
network administrator left the switch physically connected to a nearby node,
probably to some kind of management terminal. It is very possible that the
default credentials (username and password), which can also be found in the
user manual, have never been changed. So, if an attacker could gain access to
this connected node, pivoting to the switch might be easy. The following Linux
command checks for existing serial devices:
dmesg | grep ttyS
53
The default is usually /dev/ttyS0. The result of an attacker gaining console
access on an InfiniBand switch could be just as damaging as that of the Subnet
Manager Hijacking discussed previously. The difference might be the level of
impact in that there is only one Subnet Manager per subnet whereas there
can be multiple switches. Nonetheless, commands run on a switch can have
an impact on the entire fabric. This thesis will explore connecting to a switch
directly and remotely.
3.6.5 Category: Collection.
Collection is the method by which an attacker obtains the information they were
seeking.
• Falsified Memory Keys
Unintended acquisition of RDMA memory keys could allow an attacker to read
from or write to a remote memory region. This attack cannot be attempted
unless a way to manually craft or manipulate packets is discovered. Even if
cleartext memory keys were obtained from packets transiting the network, these
would not be usable as is.
3.6.6 Category: Exfiltration.
This tactic category is being more loosely interpreted as creating the desired effect,
instead of merely exfiltrating data from a victim device or network. The reason for
this change was that Denial of Service (DoS) attacks do not fit nicely into any MITRE
ATT&CK Matrix category.
• Denial of Service Attacks
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Denial of Service attacks attempt to disable a node or program by various
means, including consuming all its resources or shutting it down entirely. This
is most often a means to an end, such as allowing an attacker to thwart defenses
or migrating to a failover service or situation that may be more advantageous.
A common DoS attack is a ping flood. The goal is to saturate a victim machine
or network link with so many ping packets that legitimate traffic is dropped
or severely stalled. The ibping command will be run in one (command line)
terminal on one machine, on multiple terminals on one machine, and finally on
multiple machines.
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IV. Analysis
This chapter will describe the process of conducting a Cyber Vulnerability As-
sessment (CVA) on an InfiniBand network once planning and preparation have been
completed, and the assessment team is on site. At a high level, this framework is not
significantly different from how other CVAs are conducted. However, the details of
the assessment relating to unique considerations of InfiniBand make this a distinct
process. Finally, results and analysis from testing the attack primitives from section
3.6 will be discussed.
4.1 Assessment Execution Process
A CVA is usually a multi-phased process. More than one site visit is often re-
quired due to budgetary constraints, scheduling considerations, customer availability,
and team learning time. Networks can vary significantly in their design, usage, and
collection of software applications. This information is not always communicated
clearly (if at all) over e-mail or during meetings prior to the assessment team’s ini-
tial visit. Therefore, interviewing network administrators, programmers, maintainers,
and users is extremely beneficial for giving different perspectives on how the system
functions.
4.1.1 Phase: Information Gathering.
This information gathering is the first stage in a CVA. Network and building maps
are essential, but the client often has outdated or inaccurate versions of these, so the
team should verify the products given to them. InfiniBand Local IDentifiers (LIDs)
are dynamically assigned, so they can change, but Global Unique IDentifiers (GUIDs)
should not. Hostnames, physical equipment locations, and details regarding segre-
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gation elements (e.g. subnets, partitions, Virtual Lanes) should also be confirmed.
InfiniBand diagnostic utilities can obtain much of the pertinent data, but their out-
puts are merely textual and are not very user-friendly. Verification of authorized
software and users can be a longer task in enterprise networks, but HPC clusters tend
to be more homogeneous. It may be worthwhile to search the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) National Vulnerability Database (NVD) for known
vulnerabilities in any publicly available software [55]. However, this is unlikely to be
fruitful given the preponderance of custom applications in the HPC world.
Checking for improper physical connections is much more challenging. Wiring
diagrams may be needed, especially for larger facilities and any vehicular systems.
Teams must be on the lookout for rogue equipment. Physical attacks are more chal-
lenging when fiber cables are used. Copper cables can be tapped, and splitters can
be installed to mirror traffic. Optical splitters are available now as well [56]. Security
testers and criminals alike have been known to unplug the cable from a networked
computer or printer and connect their laptop instead, for instance. Ideally, attacks
such as this would not be possible, but proper countermeasures (e.g. port security)
are not always activated. Teams should also look for unlabeled or improperly marked
removable media (e.g. CDs, USB drives). Organizational policy should dictate what
types of media and/or which individually registered devices are allowed inside the
facility. Ideally these would be logged and scanned (for contents, not necessarily
viruses) when the owner enters and exits.
The goal of the information gathering phase is to identify and understand the way
the organization operates so that a network baseline can be established [57]. Highly
sophisticated cyber actors, so called Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), who may
have the capability to gain access to a high-performance computing (HPC) cluster,
will not likely leave obvious traces behind. Instead of searching for blatantly mali-
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cious files, processes and network traffic, the team should attempt to determine what
normal activity is in order to differentiate it from what is abnormal. Unauthorized
software such as computer games may not be an actual security problem but rather
an indication of larger concerns.
Once the assessment team has established a network baseline, it can determine
the key terrain (critical nodes) and document initial findings. This is not meant to
be an evaluation or a condemnation of particular employees or groups. Instead, it is
an opportunity to highlight security weaknesses and oversights. Not all issues can be
fixed; some can only be mitigated. An important consideration in this determination
is cost of any additional equipment and software and of their implementation. This is
the crux of the next CVA phase, which is the secure or hardening stage. Information
gathering never ceases completely, but the focus shifts to finding solutions or ways to
improve the current security situation.
4.1.2 Phase: Hardening.
Solutions do not need to be expensive or complex. Examples include changing
access control methods (e.g. rule-based, role-based), requiring individual user ac-
counts, strengthening password complexity/length/age, disabling Internet Protocol
over InfiniBand (IPoIB), if possible, and increasing auditing/logging levels. Stopping
attacks at the network level is difficult, since security middleware devices do not exist
for InfiniBand currently. However, resiliency can be improved by adding or upgrad-
ing backup systems and electrical power sources, for instance. In lieu of multi-layered
defense in depth, special attention should be paid to locking down remote access. Ac-
counts not in use should be deleted or at least disabled. Multi-factor authentication
is preferred, if available, requiring use of a physical token or biometric signature(s).
Much of the hardening stage involves making policy changes. Upgrading software
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and firmware is a susceptible but important event, so a regular schedule should be
made for doing so. Hot patches should be applied as soon as possible, and all updates
should be validated as to their source and cryptographic hash (or file size and name
at the very least). Periodic validation (attestation) of critical software and firmware
should be performed as well to ensure that no tampering or accidental manipulation
has occurred. The assessment team should take more of a supportive role during this
stage, assisting the local employees in implementing recommended improvements.
4.1.3 Phase: Monitoring.
The next phase in a CVA is the protect or monitoring stage. Network hardening
is a constant process, but once a satisfactory level has been attained, it is time to
evaluate whether the improvements made were effective and to clear the network of
any unwanted or potentially dangerous code. The desired end state is a clean network
defended by well equipped maintainers, if not dedicated cybersecurity personnel. All
executables, scripts, and compressed files on every network node should be reviewed.
Text and data files will probably be too numerous and large to be worth looking into,
but the team can confirm that these have the correct file header. This is also known as
a file’s “magic number.” A Windows .exe file should start with the ASCII characters
“MZ” (0x4D5A in hexadecimal), for instance, so if a .txt file has that file header,
something is seriously wrong. The file command in Linux checks these headers based
on the /etc/magic database.
The most advanced cyber threats leave behind little or no evidence on disk. This
is why monitoring running processes is so important. The key is to look for outliers,
because it is very unlikely a skilled hacker would have instances of their malicious code
running on a majority of the nodes. This would be less stealthy and would incremen-
tally increase the attacker’s likelihood of being detected. Live memory forensics is
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very challenging but possible. It involves taking snapshots of memory, so it can only
see what is currently running. Nonetheless, memory forensics can be very effective,
because malicious code cannot be obfuscated in memory unlike on disk or while in
transit where compression, packing, encryption, encoding, and polymorphism can all
be employed.
Another necessary place to look is autorun locations such as registry keys, sched-
uled tasks, cron jobs, and services. These can be an exception to the standard of not
leaving traces on disk, because attackers want persistence in case they lose access for
whatever reason. Gaining access to a closed network requires significant resources,
so losing access would be costly. Once again, comparison across all nodes can reveal
oddities.
4.1.4 Phase: Follow-up.
The last stage of a CVA is performing follow-up and/or returning when a major
equipment upgrade or software transition takes place. Given the relatively short
duration and high cost of most CVAs, not every piece of data will be analyzed while
the team is on site. This is especially true for InfiniBand systems, because these
are high bandwidth networks operating around the clock. Furthermore, the client
sometimes forgets to inform the team about some aspect of their network or is unaware
of it at the time, so future consulting can be valuable.
Performing a Cyber Vulnerability Assessment is a rigorous task, because assess-
ment team members must become system experts within a short period of time. It
is unlikely that the team will be given months to study the network (and facilities)
beforehand. Even if initial planning takes place well in advance, the team proba-
bly has other taskings occupying its schedule, so the key is to be efficient. The team
should develop a few questionnaires tailored to different types of InfiniBand networks.
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These questions should cover all administrative issues as well as basic details about
the network and users so that the team can ask follow-up questions and discuss more
advanced topics when on site. The client should be made aware that an incomplete
response to the questionnaire could prolong the duration or lower the quality of the
CVA.
4.2 Likely Threats to InfiniBand
Very little, if any, information has been published about confirmed attacks on
InfiniBand networks. This is not entirely surprising considering the level of sophisti-
cation required to gain access to high-performance systems. Nonetheless, in order to
remain proactive, it is imperative that the HPC community and security researchers
consider the most probable threats to this portion of the computing market.
The first step is to consider the concept of risk. There are many formulas for
determining risk, but this one is widely accepted [58]:
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Impact
This and similar formulas are not intended to be literal mathematical products but
instead a method for breaking down risk into component factors. Impact, also called
consequence, is the set of possible outcomes if a successful attack were to occur.
Usually the worst case scenario is assumed. If that scenario only involved a couple
more hours of work for network administrators, then the impact would not be very
severe. Conversely, a network breach could lead to the loss of valuable research or
trade secrets and ruin the organization’s reputation, causing irreparable damage and
great financial harm. Vulnerability is the level of exposure, how difficult the system’s
weaknesses are to exploit. It is relatively easy to enter a building through an open
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window as opposed to trying to defeat a retinal and hand print scanner monitored by
trained, armed guards.
The last component of risk is the threat, which can be further broken down into
capability times intent. Many people may have the desire to rob a bank, but few have
the ability to do so without getting caught. It is the combination of capability and
intent that makes an attacker truly dangerous. Some refer to threat and vulnerability
together as the likelihood of (successful) attack. Returning to the risk equation, it is
safe to say to that the impact of a cyber attack on a high-performance system could
be quite high, whereas the vulnerability is probably low. The unknown factor is the
threat.
Previous sections covered cyber threat intelligence and the existence of APTs.
FireEye, Inc. is one company that tracks the attribution and activities of known
APT groups [40]. According to their list of current threats, some APTs have targeted
governmental and industry sectors that contain InfiniBand users. Table 7 shows
several groups who may be involved in attempts to penetrate InfiniBand networks.
Table 7. Threat Groups Possibly Targeting InfiniBand Networks
APT # Targeted Sectors/Networks
1 IT, Scientific Research, Energy
3 High Tech
5 High-Tech Manufacturing
17 U.S. Government, IT Companies
18 High Tech
30 Air-gapped Networks
33 Energy
37 Electronics, Manufacturing, Healthcare
38 Financial Institutions
This list is not exhaustive by any means. It is merely pointing out that even the most
advanced cyber actors are not usually complete mysteries. Their code and behavior
often follow recognizable patterns or trends. Organizations should be cognizant of
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who may be targeting their networks and should participate in cyber intelligence
sharing.
4.3 Individual Attacks/Findings
Section 4.1 discussed how a notional assessment should be performed. In this
section, actual tests were run in attempt to exploit weaknesses in core InfiniBand
products.
4.3.1 OFED Diagnostic Tools.
These diagnostic tools are categorized in Table 8. An affirmative in the third
column indicates that the authors have used or believe these tools can be used in
a malicious manner. This includes possible usage as part of a larger cyber weapon.
Some of these OFED tools require the user to be running as root or another local ad-
ministrator account. Nonetheless, these commands can be run from any node and will
affect the entire fabric just the same. The result is that every node becomes a critical
one. Windows-based networks differentiate between local and domain accounts such
that a local user cannot make changes on a remote node without submitting creden-
tials acceptable to the distant end. This issue will be discussed further in Chapter
5.
A particularly susceptible tool is ibccconfig. The manual page for this command
gives the following message: “WARNING −− You should understand what you are
doing before using this tool. Misuse of this tool could result in a broken fabric”
[59]. InfiniBand quality of service (QoS) is a robust system, but a key point is that
every packet is assigned a Service Level (SL). Each port’s SL to Virtual Lane (VL)
mapping table determines the VL on which the packet will be sent. The InfiniBand
Architecture (IBA) specifies a dual priority weighted round robin (WRR) scheme. In
63
Table 8. OFED Diagnostic Tools
Command(s) Man(ual)page? Exploitable? Function
ibaddr yes no simple address resolver
ibdev2netdev no no device/port status checker
ibdiagnet, iblinkinfo, ib-
netdiscover, ibnodes, ib-
switches
yes yes fabric scanners
ibdiagpath, ibtracert no, yes no route tracers
ibdump yes yes traffic sniffer
ibnetsplit yes no new subnet creator
ibping, ibsysstat yes yes connectivity verifiers
ibportstate yes yes port state querier/modifier
ibqueryerrors, perfquery yes no reports port errors
ibroute, dump_fts yes, no yes display forwarding table(s)
ibstat, ibstatus yes no ifconfig/ipconfig equivalent
ibtopodiff yes no topology difference checker
mstflint yes yes firmware burner
saquery, sminfo, smpdump,
smpquery, smparquery
yes (x4),
no maybe issue subnet admin queries
ibcacheedit yes maybe edit ibnetdiscover output
ibccconfig, ibccquery yes yes, no congestion control
this scheme, “each VL is assigned a priority (high or low) and a weight. Within a
given priority, data is transmitted from virtual lanes in approximate proportion to
their assigned weights (excluding, of course, virtual lanes that have no data to be
transmitted)” [25].
The ibccconfig tool can abused in several ways. Mapping all the SLs to the same
VL will essentially eliminate priorities. However, if an attacker wanted to subtly (or
not!!) impede certain traffic, he or she could manipulate the VL weights so that the
targeted VL was allocated a lower percentage of the total bandwidth. Another option
is to significantly increment the HighPriCounter so that all of the low priority lanes
rarely got their turn. The effect of changing maximum transmission unit (MTU) sizes
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is minimal.
Some of the other OFED diagnostic tools will be covered in later sections.
4.3.2 Malicious Firmware Installation.
How this attack is carried out depends on the location of the malicious firmware.
Mellanox provides an automatic updater tool called mlxfwmanager for Internet-
connected devices. The normal syntax is:
mlxfwmanager −−online -u -d $device
Manual firmware installation can be accomplished as follows:
mlxfwmanager_pci -i fw_file.bin
The mlxfwmanager binary could be replaced with a malicious version that would
download firmware from a location of the attacker’s choosing. In this way an autho-
rized user could unknowingly install dangerous code, although this would not work if
the file hash of the correct firmware was verified from its true source. Alternatively,
the attacker could pull a copy of the malicious firmware through his or her covert
communications channel (beacon) and install manually. Covering tracks afterwards
might be an issue, although the old version of the firmware could be re-installed later.
4.3.3 Address Spoofing.
As stated previously, LIDs and GUIDs/GIDs are the Layer 2 and 3 addresses in
InfiniBand. Mellanox asserts that “a node does not determine what the LID should
be,” because “LIDs are assigned by the subnet manager and not the node itself” [7].
Several commands can be issued to print out a host’s LID(s): ibaddr, ibdiagnet,
ibnodes, ibstat, ibnetdiscover, ibv_devices, and ibv_devinfo. Since these addresses
are assigned dynamically, it is probable that they are stored as a file instead of burned
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into the firmware (as GUIDs are). The authoritative location for LIDs appears to
be at /sys/class/infiniband/$device/ports/$port/lid, where $device and $port
are those of the HCA. (The /sys/class/infiniband/ directory was ascertained from
a Mellanox script elsewhere on the file system.) For the PC tested, these variables
were ‘mlx5_0’ and ‘mlx5_1’, respectively. The permissions on that file were initially
read-only for everyone (-r–r–r–), and the owner was root. The following commands
were run to grant full read-write access:
sudo chmod +w /sys/class/infiniband/mlx5_0/ports/1/lid
sudo chmod 777 /sys/class/infiniband/mlx5_0/ports/1/lid
The file permissions were changed, but the contents (0x2, the LID for that device/-
port) were not after these attempts to edit them:
sudo gedit /sys/class/infiniband/mlx5_0/ports/1/lid
sudo echo 0x9 >> /sys/class/infiniband/mlx5_0/ports/1/lid
It is possible that this LID file may be file locked from an application or exists in
firmware. As for GUIDs, [33] detailed how to alter the GUIDs in the HCA firmware.
This command was used initially to blank the GUIDs:
mstflint –d $PSID -blank_guids –i /usr/share/ib_firmware/. . .
mstflint –d $PSID -guids fake_GUID_1 fake_GUID_2 ..
The second command was run to spoof the GUIDs. (The Parameter-Set IDentifica-
tion, or PSID, is a unique identifier for the configuration of the firmware [60].) The
SANS paper was written in 2012 using an old version of OFED, and since then the
firmware location has changed. There is no /usr/share/ib_firmware/ directory,
and a system wide search did not reveal an obvious replacement. Nonetheless, the
mstflint command still supports GUID changing options.
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Another method attempted to accomplish address spoofing was through verbs pro-
gramming. Infiniband connections are established via Queue Pairs (QPs). MacArthur
et al. make the analogy that QPs are somewhat “comparable to the port number in
TCP and UDP, and make it possible to multiplex many independent flows to the
same destination HCA” [14]. The union ibv_gid *gid output parameter of the
ibv_query_gid() function or the return value of the ibv_get_device_guid()
method could be changed afterwards. Likewise, the struct ibv_port_attr *port_attr
parameter of ibv_query_port() contains the LID of that port (lid) as well as the
Subnet Manager’s LID (sm_lid). Unfortunately, the ibv_create_qp() function
fails to create a queue pair when given incorrect inputs, because validation occurs
when resources are attempted to be used [18].
4.3.4 Network Traffic Sniffing.
Infiniband HCAs usually have two physical ports in order to maximize fabric
effectiveness. If a host is connected to more than one networking device, an attacker
who had command line access on one of them would most likely not be able to hear
all the traffic to or from that particular host. Ethernet and InfiniBand switches
alike are typically configured through an out-of-band connection to the management
or console port. However, many network administrators prefer to have the ability
to make changes remotely. As a result, Ethernet switches commonly allow access
via telnet (port 23, unencrypted), SSH (port 22, encrypted), or even through a web
browser over HTTP/HTTPS (port 80, unencrypted or port 443, encrypted) [61].
These services are not run on InfiniBand switches without enabling IPoIB.
Nonetheless, the ibdump tool does allow a user to monitor HCA traffic. The
traditional tcpdump does not function since packets are crafted in hardware, not in
software.
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ibdump -d $device -w $filename.pcap
After running the above command, the packet capture (.pcap) file can be loaded
into Wireshark, which has an InfiniBand plugin. The plugin can decipher all bits in
the Layer 2-4 headers that are not reserved for vendor-specific fields.
4.3.5 Network Mapping.
Reconnaissance is an important step for attackers and defenders alike. Network
administrators need to discover or confirm what is on their network, and intruders
survey the landscape in order to find potential targets. Passive mapping, in the form
of traffic sniffing, is not a very easy option in InfiniBand, since, to be effective, it
requires putting a network tap on a switch, installing a hardware splitter, or altering
forwarding tables to mirror traffic. On the other hand, several of the OFED diagnostic
tools were designed to perform discovery, and use of them should not raise any alarms.
However, there are two minor limitations with tools such as ibdiagnet, iblinkinfo, and
ibnetdiscover. First of all, the outputs are all text, which is not very user friendly
or intuitive. Secondly, they list devices one at a time, not necessarily in the order in
which they are connected to each other.
There is no graphical mapping tool for InfiniBand. The open source ZenMap
python code could be adapted to InfiniBand, but this may be overkill considering
the lack of hosted services and virtual ports in InfiniBand. Furthermore, the OFED
tools provide all the necessary network information without needing to allow users
the ability to fully customize the dozens of parameter options that make text parsing
far more complicated. A relatively simple mapping program based on ibnetdiscover
was found on GitHub and was enhanced in order to display hostnames, LID and port
details in addition to the GUIDs [62]. Figure 8 shows the output of the modified
program:
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Figure 8. AFIT InfiniBand Network
This visual representation aids in human understanding of a network’s layout. It
also hastens the assessment team’s ability to identify potential issues such as traf-
fic bottlenecks/load balancing concerns and to make recommendations for improved
physical or logical network segmentation.
4.3.6 Subnet Manager Hijacking.
The method chosen to replace the master Subnet Manager (SM) is with the ib-
portstate tool. The ibstat command informs the user of the SM’s LID, so an attacker
could then run a tool such as ibnetdiscover to determine where the SM’s host is con-
nected to a switch or switches. Disabling the corresponding switch port(s) will shut
off all communication to that device, causing it to fail during polling:
ibportstate 3 1 disable
(This command tells LID 3 to disable its first port.) The malicious version of
OpenSM, waiting in slave mode, will take over as master assuming there are no other
backups. This process appears to require at least 10 seconds, but afterwards the
switch port(s) can be enabled to restore normal traffic flow. This attack has some
limitations, including if the SM is being run on a switch. Disabling all of a switch’s
ports may be irreversible without physical access.
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4.3.7 Out-of-Band Switch Access.
This attack was unsuccessful but not for an anticipated reason. Testing revealed
that the switch’s console port was shut off or disabled about 10 minutes after switch
power up. Attempts to establish a serial connection after that time went unanswered.
This could very well be a Mellanox power saving or security feature. If so, it appears
to be very effective.
Regardless, this is still a legitimate attack vector. Syntax for the MLNX-OS switch
operating system is very similar to that of Cisco IOS. This makes the transition easy
for people with network administration experience.
4.3.8 Falsified Memory Keys.
This attack vector was not attempted, because no way to manipulate packet fields
has been discovered thus far. A secondary reason was that the desired memory keys
were not able to be captured by an unintended observer. The keys are sent in plaintext
and can be seen in Wireshark after the ibdump tool is run [63]. However, unless
the malicious user is on one of the endpoint nodes or the traffic is mirrored to the
attacker’s location, he or she will not be able to view the necessary packets. If packet
manipulation were possible, then the attacker could attempt to brute force or make
educated guesses on active memory keys. However, memory keys are at least 4 bytes
in length, so there are billions (232 > 109) of possible combinations.
4.3.9 Denial of Service Attacks.
There are other ways to produce a denial of service, but this thesis only investi-
gated use of the ibping command invoking the flood option:
ibping -f 4
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The above command sends echo request packets to and receives echo reply packets
from LID 4, the victim computer, back to back without delay. During testing, a single
instance sent 265k packets in 5 seconds, or 53k per second. Running three terminals
simultaneously produced 1.6M packets in 8.5 seconds, or 217k per second when the
ends of the capture were removed to account for starting and stopping the commands
manually. Four terminals generated 290k packets per second adjusted. Lastly, five
terminals each were run on two different hosts for a total of ten simultaneous ibping
instances. In this case, 4.5M packets were sent in 9.8 seconds, or 582k per second
adjusted. The volume seemed to scale fairly linearly according to limited sampling.
No major packet loss or other harmful effects were observed, but it is possible that
hundreds of instances could create a distributed denial of service (DDoS).
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V. Proposed Tools & Mitigations
This chapter makes recommendations for cyber software and hardware solutions
that could be adapted for the InfiniBand Architecture (IBA). Possible security flaws
in existing tools are also explored.
5.1 InfiniBand Cyber Tools
There is an argument to be made that InfiniBand is safer without cybersecurity
testing software. In Ethernet networks, many of the same “hacking tools” are used by
both attackers and defenders. As it stands with InfiniBand, there is some degree of
security by obscurity taking place. Nonetheless, dedicated cyber actors will inevitably
create custom InfiniBand tools, especially if none exist already. The benefit of having
industry standard tools is that they are known and can be tailored so as to not
have malicious or overly powerful options. Nmap, for example, offers parameters for
address spoofing and performing zombie scans [64]. These options appear to have
little or no legitimate uses.
The graphical network mapping tool shown in Chapter 4 is a nice prototype, but
there is much room for improvement. Other fields may be useful to administrators
and defenders such as port states, chassis information, logged on user(s), and more.
This idea taken to the extreme would be a near real-time monitoring program similar
to a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) used in the Industrial Control System (ICS)
world. The difference is that this tool should not allow remote changes, lest it become
too powerful.
The next proposed tool would be for file integrity checking. Currently, if an
attacker replaced the binary for OpenSM or for an OFED diagnostic tool with a
malicious executable (with similar functionality or not), it might be difficult to de-
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termine this had happened without manual verification such as taking a file hash of
the binary and comparing it to a known good copy. That process is inefficient, but
a local (or network) script could do it periodically. Ideally, a rogue Subnet Manager
would not be allowed to participate in polling so that it would never become the
master. A couple minor hurdles with this approach would be performing software
upgrades and if different versions of the same programs were allowed on the network
simultaneously.
The last proposed tool deals with a fundamental shortcoming of Linux and In-
finiBand, that being the lack of network or domain user accounts. It is true that
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) solutions such as OpenLDAP exist,
but these are not widely used [65]. The problem is that a user who gains root access
on a host, either directly through the root account or inclusion in the /etc/sudoers
file, would have nearly unrestricted access on the network. This might be acceptable
if the sudoer and /etc/group files were tightly managed and always up-to-date, but
this is not a trivial task. Non-administrative users may require temporary root access
to install software or to run certain diagnostic tools or other programs so that their
scripts and applications run correctly. There are additional ways to restrict network
access such as creating more subnets and partitions, but these mechanisms shrink the
effective size of the network instead of limiting what users can do on it. A purely
InfiniBand variation of OpenLDAP could be very useful to network administrators.
5.2 Defense in Depth
As previously mentioned, implementing Defense in Depth on InfiniBand systems
is difficult due the flat hierarchy of switched fabrics. In addition, the lack of virtual
port usage means that a traditional (internal) firewall would not be effective. (Having
a firewall at the network perimeter is as critical as always.) Only an application layer
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firewall would be of any use at all inside an InfiniBand fabric, and even then it would
increase network latency significantly, assuming such a device could actually keep up
with the traffic volume. Adding security features to a system comes at a cost in terms
of decreased performance, more electrical power, increased design complexity, and/or
additional monetary or manpower expenses. Sometimes this trade off is favorable,
but in this case network owners would not (and should not) tolerate such delays
considering that throughput and latency are two of the primary reasons to purchase
and employ InfiniBand equipment.
The idea of instituting InfiniBand traffic monitoring is still worth considering,
however. Traffic could be mirrored to a secondary location, either through physical
splitters, network taps, and/or Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) ports. After that,
the question is what to do with the data. The passive option would be to store it
for future review and/or analytics. This is similar to the function of a data historian
in ICS networks. (It should be noted that the duration of storage might be very
limited unless Petabyte storage is available or filters are able to significantly reduce
redundant information.) The active option would be something akin to an Intrusion
Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS), although those devices rely on user-created
and community signatures. It is possible that signatures could be developed, but
defenders would have to know what potentially malicious traffic looks like. Further-
more, high-performance networks often employ custom software, so the organization
might not get much external help in building up this device.
The most viable traffic monitoring alternative appears to be an IDS device run by
an Artificial Intelligence (AI) program. An AI could learn normal traffic patterns and
could alert a human cyber defender of abnormal activities. There is a chance for high
false positive rates, but high-performance networks tend to be more homogeneous,
and the program could be tuned over time to decrease the amount of false alerts.
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5.3 Modifications to Existing Products
Beyond inventing new security tools and devices, it is important to consider how
security aspects of current products might be improved. A positive step that Oracle
recently took was introducing signed firmware [66]. This is a more secure and faster
way of validating the authenticity of firmware. Manual verification is not foolproof,
and posting the cryptographic hash of the real firmware on a public website could
give an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) time to find a hash collision and apparent
legitimacy afterwards. Other InfiniBand manufacturers should consider mandating
signed firmware as well.
A major security concern in InfiniBand systems will always be the Subnet Man-
ager, because it is a powerful network entity. The fact that OpenSM is open source
exacerbates this concern, because anyone with the proper expertise could study the
code to learn how it is implemented and to identify any weaknesses or critical de-
pendencies it might have. This thesis has not exhaustively studied OpenSM, but
there does not appear to be way to disallow new hosts from joining the network. In
Ethernet, enabling port security and disabling Dynamic Host Configuration Proto-
col (DHCP) are two methods to prevent an unauthorized device on the network. A
malicious insider should not be able to receive a dynamically assigned address by con-
necting their own device to a switch or by removing the Small Form-factor Pluggable
(SFP) optical transceiver from an existing node and using that cable instead.
Another potential Subnet Manager issue is that Mellanox’s switch operating sys-
tem, MLNX-OS, has a command called ib sm ignore-other-sm that “ignores all the
rules governing SM elections and attempts to manage the fabric” [67]. That sounds
like a dangerous command that only exists for user convenience. Given console access
to other nodes, a network administrator should be able to stop any unwanted Subnet
Manager instances. This discussion makes an inquisitive mind wonder how this com-
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mand works and whether or not it usually succeeds. Mellanox would probably not
use a destructive technique such as the one used in this thesis, but the description for
the show ib sm sm-priority command says that if two or more active SMs have
the same highest priority (between 0 and 15), the one with the lowest port Global
Unique IDentifier (GUID) will manage the fabric.
Armed with this knowledge, an APT could manufacture counterfeit Channel
Adapters with extremely low GUIDs burned into them. These network cards could
have a logic bomb or hardware backdoor that occasionally attempts to beacon home
through the Internet or that listens for covert communications channels (i.e. port
knocking). They might also allow an informed user to craft malformed packets via
a custom driver, as well as having an advantage in Subnet Manager elections. This
amount of speculation may frustrate some readers, but it is exactly the creativity
needed to anticipate the most grave threats.
A more abstract idea for improving the security of fabric management is mov-
ing to a Software Defined Networking (SDN) approach. SDN separates a network’s
control and data planes, so management occurs out-of-band [68]. Currently, Subnet
Management Packets are sent in-band on Virtual Lane (VL) 15. Another benefit of
SDN is rapid network reconfigurability. Part of the initiative for developing SDN
was the fact that updating the rules and configuration files on traditional network-
ing equipment is very time- and skill-intensive. This is not suitable for the needs of
modern, adaptable networks such as clouds. Then again, the whole concept of SDN
is somewhat at odds with InfiniBand, which shifts a lot of functionality from software
to hardware. Furthermore, high-performance networks are often designed and tuned
to perform a specific mission very well. Despite this, Mellanox realized the need for
SDN capabilities. The company’s Unified Fabric Manager (UFM R©) claims to have
SDN features but is proprietary software, so it was not tested in this thesis [69].
76
Another way to improve network security and adaptability is through compatibil-
ity with virtualization technologies such as Linux containers. Mellanox has started
this process as well through its Single Root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV) and Docker
support [21]. Virtualization is the polar opposite of shared memory, in that virtual
machines (VMs) and containers do not have any external dependencies and usually
operate as self-contained units. Virtualization also improves resiliency, because a
compromised VM or container can easily be returned to a known good snapshot or
state. Common container usage involves starting up a new instance when one is
needed and tearing it down upon task completion or when it is no longer necessary.
The primary security concern would be if the repository were to get infected.
The proposals in this chapter are not meant to be an exhaustive list. The intent
is to initiate discussions and innovation regarding InfiniBand and high-performance
computing (HPC) security. If multiple vulnerabilities are found and published, they
should probably be included in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) using the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [55].
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VI. Conclusion & Future Work
Although the InfiniBand Trade Association did not make cybersecurity its top
priority when it designed and developed the InfiniBand Architecture, it is evident
that many features of InfiniBand are inherently resistant to tampering and attack.
Hardware packet crafting, predetermined routing, and the redundant pathways of a
switched fabric topology contribute to the very low network latency and high avail-
ability that the high-performance computing (HPC) industry needs. InfiniBand does
somewhat rely on external defense mechanisms such as firewalls and other forms of
network segregation. However, HPC clusters were intended to be located in data ware-
houses behind Demilitarized Zones, not providing services as Internet facing servers.
This is part of the justification as to why the association decided not to incorporate
packet encryption or provide support to protocols running over TCP/IP.
Nonetheless, some minor security upgrades could make the InfiniBand Architec-
ture more difficult to exploit without significantly degrading network performance.
The Subnet Manager is such a critical component, that it should have some protec-
tions in place should the master fail. A possible solution could be file verification,
whereby a node could not become the master if its OpenSM file hashes did not match
those of the other standby nodes. Also, simple denial of service attacks such as
disabling switch ports from any host or invoking massive ping floods should not be
allowed, even if the user is operating with elevated system privileges. In addition to
improving existing software, new cyber tools and security devices could be created
to bolster InfiniBand defenses. A graphical mapping tool, network account manage-
ment software, and an InfiniBand variant of an Intrusion Detection System are a few
examples of these.
This thesis presented a framework for evaluating the cybersecurity posture of
an InfiniBand network. The most important step is performing risk analysis and
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considering serious threats to the system. Before conducting a Cyber Vulnerability
Assessment (CVA), however, an assessment team must be assembled with the proper
skillsets and equipment. A plan and scope for the assessment must be developed
with guidance from the client. Once on site, the team should work hand-in-hand
with local system owners, maintainers, and users to learn about the network and
establish a baseline. At this point, the team can assist personnel with implementing
any recommended changes and upgrades. The network must be cleared of unwanted
or potentially dangerous code, and local maintainers must be confident about their
ability to defend the network after the team’s departure.
The big picture concepts in this framework are not different from how CVAs are
conducted on other networks. What makes this research contribution unique is in
its distinctions between HPC and traditional Information Technology (IT) networks,
in the terminology, usage of, and threats to both, as well as between the InfiniBand
and Internet Protocol (IP) stacks. This thesis also performed a holistic security
evaluation of InfiniBand, including its protocol, hardware, supporting software, and
network architecture. The focus was on a generic network and core software, but
current and future InfiniBand use cases were explored.
There are many possibilities for follow-on research of this topic. Any of the pro-
posals from Chapter 5 might make a good candidate, but some of these would be
suitable for a research group instead of a single individual. A student with more
extensive hardware knowledge might consider attempting to develop a custom Chan-
nel Adapter driver or firmware. A more software-intensive selection could involve
construction of cyber tool, possibly for parsing, storing, and cataloging InfiniBand
network traffic.
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Appendix A. Graphical Mapping Tool
#!/ usr /bin /env python
2 #
# Copyright (C) 2016 Vange l i s Tasoulas <vange l i s@tasou la s . net>
4 #
# This program i s f r e e so f tware : you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
6 # i t under the terms o f the GNU General Publ ic L icense as publ i shed by
# the Free Software Foundation , e i t h e r ve r s i on 3 o f the License , or
8 # ( at your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
#
10 # This program i s d i s t r i bu t ed in the hope that i t w i l l be use fu l ,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the impl ied warranty o f
12 # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Publ ic L icense f o r more d e t a i l s .
14 #
# You should have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the GNU General Publ ic L icense
16 # along with t h i s program . I f not , s ee <http ://www. gnu . org / l i c e n s e s />.
18 # ∗∗This ve r s i on has been updated by Daryl Schmitt and Lucas Mire l e s .∗∗
20 from __future__ import pr int_funct ion
import os
22 import sys
import re
24 import argparse
import l ogg ing
26 import time
import pygraphviz as pgv
28 import xml . e t r e e . ElementTree as et
import xml .dom. minidom as md
30 from c o l l e c t i o n s import OrderedDict
32 __all__ = [
’ quick_regexp ’ , ’ print_ ’ ,
34 ’ hex_to_rgb ’ , ’LOG’
]
36
PROGRAM_NAME = ’ Inf in iBand−Graphviz−ua l i z a t i o n ’
38 VERSION = ’ 0 . 2 . 1 ’
AUTHOR = ’ Vange l i s Tasoulas , Daryl Schmitt , and Lucas Mire l e s ’
40
LOG = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ d e f au l t . ’ + __name__)
42
################################################
44 ############### HELPER FUNCTIONS ###############
################################################
46
#−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
48 de f error_and_exit ( message ) :
"""
50 Pr int s the "message" and e x i t s with s ta tu s 1
"""
52 pr in t ( "\nFATAL ERROR:\ n" + message + "\n" )
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e x i t (1 )
54
#−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
56 de f print_ ( value_to_be_printed , pr int_indent=0, spaces_per_indent=4, endl="\n" ) :
"""
58 This funct ion , among anything e l s e , i t w i l l p r i n t d i c t i o n a r i e s ( even nested ones ) in a good
look ing way
60 # value_to_be_printed : The only needed argument and i t i s the
text /number/ d i c t i ona ry to be pr inted
62 # print_indent : indenta t i on f o r the pr inted text ( i t i s used f o r
n i c e l ook ing d i c t i ona ry p r i n t s ) ( d e f au l t i s 0)
64 # spaces_per_indent : De f ines the number o f spaces per indent ( d e f au l t i s 4)
# endl : De f ines the end o f l i n e charac t e r ( d e f au l t i s \n)
66
More i n f o here :
68 http :// s tackove r f l ow . com/ ques t i ons /19473085/ create−a−nested−d ic t i onary−for−a−word−python?
answertab=ac t i v e#tab−top
"""
70
i f ( i s i n s t a n c e ( value_to_be_printed , d i c t ) ) :
72 f o r key , value in value_to_be_printed . i t e r i t em s ( ) :
i f ( i s i n s t a n c e ( value , d i c t ) ) :
74 print_ ( ’ {0}{1! r } : ’ . format ( pr int_indent ∗ spaces_per_indent ∗ ’ ’ , key ) )
print_ ( value , pr int_indent + 1)
76 e l s e :
print_ ( ’ {0}{1! r } : {2} ’ . format ( pr int_indent ∗ spaces_per_indent ∗ ’ ’ , key , value ) )
78 e l s e :
s t r i n g = ( ’ {0}{1}{2} ’ . format ( pr int_indent ∗ spaces_per_indent ∗ ’ ’ , value_to_be_printed ,
endl ) )
80 sys . stdout . wr i t e ( s t r i n g )
82 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
def hex_to_rgb ( value ) :
84 value = value . l s t r i p ( ’#’ )
lv = len ( value )
86 return tup le ( i n t ( value [ i : i + lv // 3 ] , 16) f o r i in range (0 , lv , l v // 3) )
88 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
c l a s s quick_regexp ( ob j e c t ) :
90 """
Quick r egu l a r expr e s s i on c l a s s , which can be used d i r e c t l y in i f ( ) statements in a per l−l i k e
f a sh i on .
92
#### Sample code ####
94 r = quick_regexp ( )
i f ( r . s earch ( ’ pattern ( t e s t ) (123) ’ , s t r i n g ) ) :
96 p r in t ( r . groups [ 0 ] ) # Pr int s ’ t e s t ’
p r i n t ( r . groups [ 1 ] ) # Pr int s ’123 ’
98 """
de f __init__( s e l f ) :
100 s e l f . groups = None
s e l f . matched = False
102
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def search ( s e l f , pattern , s t r i ng , f l a g s =0) :
104 match = re . search ( pattern , s t r ing , f l a g s )
i f match :
106 s e l f . matched = True
i f (match . groups ( ) ) :
108 s e l f . groups = re . search ( pattern , s t r i ng , f l a g s ) . groups ( )
e l s e :
110 s e l f . groups = True
e l s e :
112 s e l f . matched = False
s e l f . groups = None
114
return s e l f . matched
116
#−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
118
########################################
120 ###### Conf igure l ogg ing behavior ######
########################################
122 # No need to change anything here
124 de f _conf igureLogging ( l o g l e v e l ) :
"""
126 Conf igures the d e f au l t l o gge r .
128 I f the log l e v e l i s s e t to NOTSET (0) , the
l ogg ing i s d i s ab l ed
130
# More i n f o here : https :// docs . python . org /2/howto/ l ogg ing . html
132 """
numeric_log_level = ge t a t t r ( logg ing , l o g l e v e l . upper ( ) , None )
134 try :
i f not i s i n s t a n c e ( numeric_log_level , i n t ) :
136 r a i s e ValueError ( )
except ValueError :
138 error_and_exit ( ’ I nva l i d log l e v e l : %s \n ’
’ \ tLog l e v e l must be s e t to one o f the f o l l ow ing : \ n ’
140 ’ \ t CRITICAL <− Least verbose \n ’
’ \ t ERROR\n ’
142 ’ \ t WARNING\n ’
’ \ t INFO\n ’
144 ’ \ t DEBUG <− Most verbose ’ % l o g l e v e l )
146 de fau l tLogger = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ d e f au l t ’ )
148 # I f numeric_log_level == 0 (NOTSET) , d i s ab l e l ogg ing .
i f ( not numeric_log_level ) :
150 numeric_log_level = 1000
de fau l tLogger . s e tLeve l ( numeric_log_level )
152
logFormatter = logg ing . Formatter ( )
154
de fau l tHand le r = logg ing . StreamHandler ( )
156 de fau l tHandle r . setFormatter ( logFormatter )
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158 de fau l tLogger . addHandler ( de fau l tHand le r )
160 #######################################################
###### Add command l i n e opt ions in t h i s func t i on ######
162 #######################################################
# Add the user de f ined command l i n e arguments in t h i s func t i on
164
de f _command_Line_Options ( ) :
166 """
Def ine the accepted command l i n e arguments in t h i s func t i on
168
Read the documentation o f argparse f o r more advanced command l i n e
170 argument pars ing examples
http :// docs . python . org /2/ l i b r a r y / argparse . html
172 """
174 par se r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n=PROGRAM_NAME + " ve r s i on " + VERSION)
176 par se r . add_argument ( "−v" , "−−ve r s i on " ,
ac t i on=" ve r s i on " , d e f au l t=argparse .SUPPRESS,
178 ve r s i on=VERSION,
help="show program ’ s ve r s i on number and ex i t " )
180
loggingGroupOpts = par se r . add_argument_group ( ’ Logging Options ’ , ’ L i s t o f op t i ona l l ogg ing
opt ions ’ )
182 loggingGroupOpts . add_argument ( "−q" , "−−qu i e t " ,
ac t i on=" store_true " ,
184 de f au l t=False ,
dest=" i sQu i e t " ,
186 help="Disab le l ogg ing in the conso l e . Nothing w i l l be pr inted . " )
loggingGroupOpts . add_argument ( "− l " , "−− l o g l e v e l " ,
188 ac t i on=" s t o r e " ,
d e f au l t="INFO" ,
190 dest=" l o g l e v e l " ,
metavar="LOG_LEVEL" ,
192 help="LOG_LEVEL might be s e t to : CRITICAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO,
DEBUG. ( Defau l t : INFO)" )
194 par se r . add_argument ( "−f " , "−−topology− f i l e " ,
ac t i on=" s t o r e " ,
196 requ i r ed=True ,
dest=" topo_f i l e " ,
198 metavar="TOPOLOGY" ,
help="Topology f i l e to load the data from . " )
200 par s e r . add_argument ( "−d" , "−−deta i l ed−topo" ,
ac t i on=" store_true " ,
202 de f au l t=False ,
dest=" deta i led_topo " ,
204 help=" I f the user needs a d e t a i l e d topology , use ’ record ’ shapes and draw
ind i v i dua l por t s on each shape . Note that a d e t a i l e d topology might be good f o r v i s u a l i z a t i o n ,
but i t i s not supported by Gephi . \ n"
"Defau l t : Fa l se ( use ’ r e c t ang l e ’ shapes with mul t ip l e connect ions ) . " )
206 par s e r . add_argument ( "−c" , "−−use−c l u s t e r s " ,
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ac t i on=" store_true " ,
208 de f au l t=False ,
dest=" use_c lus t e r s " ,
210 help=" I f enabled , HCAs ( nodes ) connected on the same swi tches are grouped
in the same c l u s t e r . \ n"
"Unfortunate ly only ’ dot ’ supports c l u s t e r i n g at the moment , so
c l u s t e r i n g i s d i s ab l ed by de f au l t . \ n"
212 "Defau lt : Fa l se " )
par se r . add_argument ( "−o" , "−−optimized−for−black−bg" ,
214 ac t i on=" store_true " ,
d e f au l t=False ,
216 dest="optimize_black_bg" ,
help="Gephi can make r e a l l y good look ing graphs on black background . I f
you are about to p lo t a f i n a l graph on black background then use t h i s opt ion to opt imize the
c o l o r s f o r i t . \ n"
218 "Defau l t : Fa l se " )
par se r . add_argument ( "−r " , "−−render− f i l e " ,
220 ac t i on=" store_true " ,
d e f au l t=False ,
222 dest=" r ende r_ f i l e " ,
he lp=" I f enabled , the output w i l l be rendered with the ’ neato ’ layout , and
saved in a PDF f i l e . \ n"
224 "Defau l t : Fa l se " )
par se r . add_argument ( "−e" , "−−export−gex f " ,
226 ac t i on=" store_true " ,
d e f au l t=False ,
228 dest=" export_gexf " ,
help="Support f o r DOT f i l e s in Gephi i s r e a l l y bad . Use t h i s opt ion to
export a gex f f i l e i f you want to play with the graph in Gephi . \ n"
230 "Defau l t : Fa l se " )
232 opts = par se r . parse_args ( )
234 i f ( opts . i sQu i e t ) :
opts . l o g l e v e l = "NOTSET"
236
return opts
238
##################################################
240 ############### WRITE MAIN PROGRAM ###############
##################################################
242
i f __name__ == ’__main__ ’ :
244 """
Write the main program here
246 """
# Parse the command l i n e opt ions
248 opt ions = _command_Line_Options ( )
# Conf igure l ogg ing
250 _conf igureLogging ( opt ions . l o g l e v e l )
252 LOG. i n f o ( "{} v{} i s running . . . \ n" . format (PROGRAM_NAME, VERSION) )
254 ######################################
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#LOG. c r i t i c a l ("CRITICAL messages are pr inted ")
256 #LOG. e r r o r ("ERROR messages are pr inted ")
#LOG. warning ("WARNING messages are pr inted ")
258 #LOG. i n f o ("INFO message are pr inted ")
#LOG. debug ("DEBUG messages are pr inted ")
260
# I f the user needs a d e t a i l e d topology , use " record " shapes and draw ind i v i dua l por t s on each
shape .
262 # Otherwise , use " r e c t ang l e " shapes with mul t ip l e connect ions .
#
264 # Unfortunately , a d e t a i l e d topology i s not supported by Gephi .
# Disab l ing by de f au l t .
266 d e t a i l e d = opt ions . deta i led_topo
268 # I f enabled , HCAs ( nodes ) connected on the same swi tches are grouped in the same c l u s t e r .
# Unfortunate ly only ’ dot ’ supports c l u s t e r i n g at the moment , so I d i s ab l e i t by de f au l t .
270 useC lu s t e r s = opt ions . u s e_c lus t e r s
272 exportGexf = opt ions . export_gexf
274 # Read the topology and bu i ld the graph in an OrderedDict
t opo l ogy_f i l e = opt ions . t opo_f i l e
276 topology = OrderedDict ( )
num_of_switches = 0
278 num_of_hcas = 0
current_node = ""
280 with open ( topo logy_f i l e , mode=’ r ’ , bu f f e r i n g=1) as f :
i s i n s t a n c e ( f , f i l e )
282 f o r l i n e in f :
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
284 i s i n s t a n c e ( l i n e , s t r )
i f l i n e :
286 #added DWS 8 Jan 19
l id_idx = l i n e . f i nd ( ’ l i d ’ ) # Find the l a s t occurrence
288 i f ( l id_idx > 0) :
l i d = in t ( l i n e . s p l i t ( ’ l i d ’ ) [ 1 ] . s t r i p ( ) . s p l i t ( ’ ’ ) [ 0 ] )
290
r = quick_regexp ( )
292 # This regexp w i l l read the name o f nodes and the number o f por t s ( Switches or
HCAs)
i f ( r . s earch ( "^(\w+)\ s+(\d+)\ s+\"(.+?) \"\ s+#\s+\"(.+?) \"" , l i n e ) ) :
294 #print_ ( r . groups )
current_node = r . groups [ 2 ]
296 #pr in t ( current_node )
topology [ current_node ] = OrderedDict ( )
298 # Added by DWS − 8 Jan 19
topology [ current_node ] [ ’ hostname ’ ] = r . groups [ 3 ] . r ep l a c e ( ’ / ’ , ’ \\ ’ ) . s p l i t ( ’ ’ )
[ 0 ]
300 topology [ current_node ] [ ’ number_of_ports ’ ] = in t ( r . groups [ 1 ] )
302 i f r . groups [ 0 ] == ’ Switch ’ :
topology [ current_node ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] = ’ switch ’
304 # Added by DWS − 8 Jan 19
topology [ current_node ] [ ’ l i d ’ ] = l i d
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306 num_of_switches = num_of_switches + 1
e l s e :
308 topology [ current_node ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] = ’ hca ’
# Added by DWS − 8 Jan 19
310 topology [ current_node ] [ ’ l i d ’ ] = 0
num_of_hcas = num_of_hcas + 1
312
# This regexp w i l l read the port l i n e s from a dump
314 i f ( r . s earch ( " ^\[(\d+) \ ] .∗?\" ( .+? ) \"\ [ (\ d+)\ ] " , l i n e ) ) :
# Added by DWS − 8 Jan 19 . . t h i s only works i f HCA i s j u s t us ing one port
316 i f ( topology [ current_node ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] == ’ hca ’ ) and ( topology [ current_node ] [
’ number_of_ports ’ ] == 1) :
topology [ current_node ] [ ’ l i d ’ ] = l i d
318 loca l_port = in t ( r . groups [ 0 ] )
connected_to_remote_host = r . groups [ 1 ]
320 connected_to_remote_port = in t ( r . groups [ 2 ] )
topology [ current_node ] [ l oca l_port ] = {connected_to_remote_host :
connected_to_remote_port}
322
#i f ( l en ( topology ) > 1000 and de t a i l e d ) :
324 #LOG. warn ("The provided network conta in s {} nodes ( too many) and you have chosen to draw a
de t a i l e d topology . \ n"
#" I f the drawing s t a t e takes much longe r than ant i c ipated , p l e a s e run the program
again with the d e t a i l e d topology switch turned o f f . " . format ( l en ( topology ) ) )
326
G = pgv .AGraph(name = "Fat−t r e e " , s t r i c t = False )
328
################
330 # Graphviz a t t r i bu t e l i s t !
# www. graphviz . org /doc/ i n f o / a t t r s . html
332 ################
334 # Graph a t t r i b u t e s
G. graph_attr [ ’ rankd i r ’ ] = ’TB ’ # TB, BT, LR, RL
336 G. graph_attr [ ’ ranksep ’ ] = 1 .0
#G. graph_attr [ ’ nodesep ’ ] = 0 .0
338 # Type o f the edges : ( l i n e , f a l s e ) , ( sp l i n e , t rue ) , ( none , "") , curved , po ly l i n e , ortho
G. graph_attr [ ’ s p l i n e s ’ ] = ’ l i n e ’
340 # Do not a l low nodes to over lap . Sca l e makes the compi lat ion very f a s t but spreads the graph !
G. graph_attr [ ’ over lap ’ ] = ’ s c a l e ’
342 # The s i z e o f the output image in inches . Use a mul t ip l e o f 7 .75 and 10.25
# http :// s tackove r f l ow . com/ ques t i ons /3489451/how−to−set−the−width−and−heigth−of−the−ouput−
image−in−pygraphviz
344 G. graph_attr [ ’ s i z e ’ ] = " {} ,{} ! " . format (7 . 75 ∗ 12 , 10 .25 ∗ 12)
i f opt ions . optimize_black_bg :
346 G. graph_attr [ ’ bgco lo r ’ ] = ’#000000 ’
348 # Colors
i f opt ions . optimize_black_bg :
350 HCA_Color = ’#cccccc ’
HCA_Edge_Color = ’#f f 0000 ’
352 Switch_Color = ’#f f f f f f ’
Switch_Edge_Color = ’#a0a0a0 ’
354 e l s e :
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HCA_Color = ’#f f 8080 ’
356 HCA_Edge_Color = ’#f f 0000 ’
Switch_Color = ’#d5 f 6 f f ’
358 Switch_Edge_Color = ’#000000 ’
360 Cluster_Color = " ye l low "
362 # Shapes # Update by LEM − 1/9/19
HCA_Shape = " e l l i p s e "
364 Switch_Shape = "house"
366 G. add_nodes_from ( topology )
368 i f exportGexf :
#gephi_edge_id = G. number_of_nodes ( )
370 gephi_edge_id = 0
root_node = et . Element ( ’ gex f ’ )
372 root_node . a t t r i b [ ’ xmlns ’ ] = "http ://www. gex f . net /1 .3 "
root_node . a t t r i b [ ’ v e r s i on ’ ] = " 1 .3 "
374 root_node . a t t r i b [ ’ xmlns : v i z ’ ] = "http ://www. gex f . net /1 .3/ v i z "
root_node . a t t r i b [ ’ xmlns : x s i ’ ] = "http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema−i n s t ance "
376 root_node . a t t r i b [ ’ x s i : schemaLocation ’ ] = "http ://www. gex f . net /1 .3 http ://www. gex f . net /1 .3/
gex f . xsd"
meta_node = et . SubElement ( root_node , ’meta ’ , a t t r i b = { ’ l a s tmod i f i edda t e ’ : time . s t r f t ime ( "
%Y−%m−%d" ) })
378 creator_node = et . SubElement (meta_node , ’ c r e a t o r ’ )
creator_node . t ext = PROGRAM_NAME
380 descr ipt ion_node = et . SubElement (meta_node , ’ d e s c r i p t i o n ’ )
descr ipt ion_node . t ext = "Graph generated from f i l e ’{} ’ " . format ( os . path . r ea lpath (
t opo l ogy_f i l e ) )
382 graph_node = et . SubElement ( root_node , ’ graph ’ )
graph_node . a t t r i b [ ’ de fau l t edge type ’ ] = " undi rected "
384 graph_node . a t t r i b [ ’mode ’ ] = " s t a t i c "
nodes_node = et . SubElement ( graph_node , ’ nodes ’ )
386 edges_node = et . SubElement ( graph_node , ’ edges ’ )
388 # Cluste r id f o r the subgraphs
i f u s eC lu s t e r s :
390 g loba l_c lus te r_id = 0
392 # Add port s and edges
f o r node in G. nodes ( ) :
394 #Label # Update by LEM − 1/9/19
l a b e l = "Host : {0}\nLID : {1}\nGUID: {2}" . format ( topology [ node . name ] [ ’ hostname ’ ] , topology [
node . name ] [ ’ l i d ’ ] , node . name)
396 node . a t t r [ ’ l a b e l ’ ] = l a b e l
398 # Node Att r ibute s # Update by LEM − 1/10/19
node . a t t r [ ’ s t y l e ’ ] = ’ f i l l e d ’
400 node . a t t r [ ’ margin ’ ] = 0 .2
node . a t t r [ ’ f o n t s i z e ’ ] = 30
402 node . a t t r [ ’ f o n t c o l o r ’ ] = ’ black ’
404 i f u s eC lu s t e r s :
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Subgraph_For_Current_Switch = None
406
numPorts = topology [ node . name ] [ ’ number_of_ports ’ ]
408 i f topology [ node . name ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] == ’ switch ’ :
node . a t t r [ ’ shape ’ ] = Switch_Shape # Update by LEM − 1/9/19
410 node . a t t r [ ’ f i l l c o l o r ’ ] = Switch_Color
node . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] = Switch_Color
412 e l i f topology [ node . name ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] == ’ hca ’ :
node . a t t r [ ’ shape ’ ] = HCA_Shape # Update by LEM − 1/9/19
414 node . a t t r [ ’ f i l l c o l o r ’ ] = HCA_Color
node . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] = HCA_Color
416
i f exportGexf :
418 node_node = et . SubElement ( nodes_node , ’ node ’ , a t t r i b = { ’ id ’ : node . name , ’ l a b e l ’ : node
. name})
r , g , b = hex_to_rgb ( node . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] )
420 et . SubElement ( node_node , ’ v i z : c o l o r ’ , a t t r i b = { ’ r ’ : s t r ( r ) , ’ g ’ : s t r ( g ) , ’b ’ : s t r (b) ,
’ a ’ : " 0 .0 " })
422 i f ( numPorts > 0) :
f o r port in range (1 , numPorts + 1) :
424 i f ( d e t a i l e d ) :
i f port == 1 :
426 separa to r = ""
e l s e :
428 separa to r = " | "
l a b e l = "{}|<{}> {}" . format ( l abe l , port , port )
430
i f port in topology [ node . name ] . keys ( ) :
432 remote_port = topology [ node . name ] [ port ] . va lues ( ) [ 0 ]
remote_host = topology [ node . name ] [ port ] . keys ( ) [ 0 ]
434 try :
# Check i f the re i s a l ready a l i n k e s t ab l i s h ed . . .
436 # I f not , the ’ get_edge ’ command w i l l r a i s e an except ion and a new edge
w i l l be added
G. get_edge ( remote_host , node . name , key="{}−{}" . format ( port , remote_port ) )
438 except :
i f ( d e t a i l e d ) :
440 G. add_edge ( node . name , remote_host , key="{}−{}" . format ( remote_port ,
port ) , headport = remote_port , t a i l p o r t = port )
e l s e :
442 G. add_edge ( node . name , remote_host , key="{}−{}" . format ( remote_port ,
port ) )
444 edge = G. get_edge ( node . name , remote_host , key="{}−{}" . format ( remote_port ,
port ) )
446 # Edge Att r ibute s # Update by LEM − 1/10/19
edge . a t t r [ ’ penwidth ’ ] = 1
448 edge . a t t r [ ’ f o n t s i z e ’ ] = 30
edge . a t t r [ ’ head labe l ’ ] = " [ { 0 } ] " . format ( remote_port ) #port num that i s l e av ing HCA
450 edge . a t t r [ ’ t a i l l a b e l ’ ] = " [ { 0 } ] " . format ( port ) #port num that i s en t e r ing switch
edge . a t t r [ ’ minlen ’ ] = 2
452
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i f topology [ remote_host ] [ ’ node_type ’ ] == ’ hca ’ :
454 edge . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] = HCA_Edge_Color
i f u s eC lu s t e r s :
456 i f ( Subgraph_For_Current_Switch i s None ) :
Subgraph_For_Current_Switch = G. subgraph ( remote_host , ’ c l u s t e r
{} ’ . format ( g loba l_c lus te r_id ) )
458 Subgraph_For_Current_Switch . graph_attr [ ’ f i l l c o l o r ’ ] =
Cluster_Color
Subgraph_For_Current_Switch . graph_attr [ ’ s t y l e ’ ] = ’ f i l l e d ’
460 g loba l_c lus te r_id = globa l_c lus te r_id + 1
e l s e :
462 Subgraph_For_Current_Switch . add_node ( remote_host )
e l s e : # Else the node connects two swi tches .
464 edge . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] = Switch_Edge_Color
466 i f exportGexf :
gephi_edge_id += 1
468 edge_node = et . SubElement ( edges_node , ’ edge ’ ,
a t t r i b = { ’ id ’ : s t r ( gephi_edge_id ) ,
470 ’ source ’ : node . name ,
’ t a r g e t ’ : remote_host ,
472 ’ l a b e l ’ : "{} −− {}" . format ( node .
name , remote_host ) })
r , g , b = hex_to_rgb ( edge . a t t r [ ’ c o l o r ’ ] )
474 et . SubElement ( edge_node , ’ v i z : c o l o r ’ , a t t r i b = { ’ r ’ : s t r ( r ) , ’ g ’ : s t r (
g ) , ’b ’ : s t r (b) })
476 #pr in t (G. s t r i n g ( ) )
LOG. i n f o ( "Total number o f nodes : {}\n"
478 "Total number o f Switches : {}\n"
"Total number o f HCAs: {}\n"
480 "Total number o f Edges : {}" . format (num_of_hcas + num_of_switches , num_of_switches ,
num_of_hcas , l en (G. edges ( ) ) ) )
482 output_fi lename = os . path . basename ( topo l ogy_f i l e )
dot_fi lename = " {} . dot" . format ( output_fi lename )
484 G. wr i t e ( dot_fi lename )
486 LOG. i n f o ( "The dot f i l e has been saved in the f i l e ’ {0} ’ . " . format ( dot_fi lename ) )
488 i f opt ions . r ende r_ f i l e :
# twopi , gvco lor , wc , ccomps , tred , sccmap , fdp , c i r co , neato , a cyc l i c , nop , gvpr , dot ,
s fdp
490 drawing_args=’ ’
G. layout ( prog=’ neato ’ , args=drawing_args )
492 # ’ canon ’ , ’ cmap ’ , ’ cmapx ’ , ’cmapx_np ’ , ’ d ia ’ , ’ dot ’ ,
# ’ f i g ’ , ’ gd ’ , ’ gd2 ’ , ’ g i f ’ , ’ hpgl ’ , ’ imap ’ , ’ imap_np ’ ,
494 # ’ ismap ’ , ’ jpe ’ , ’ jpeg ’ , ’ jpg ’ , ’ mif ’ , ’mp ’ , ’ pc l ’ , ’ pdf ’ ,
# ’ p i c ’ , ’ p l a in ’ , ’ p la in−ext ’ , ’ png ’ , ’ ps ’ , ’ ps2 ’ , ’ svg ’ ,
496 # ’ svgz ’ , ’ vml ’ , ’ vmlz ’ , ’ vrml ’ , ’ vtx ’ , ’wbmp ’ , ’ xdot ’ , ’ x l i b ’
render_fi lename = " {} . pdf " . format ( output_fi lename )
498 G. draw ( render_f i lename )
500 LOG. i n f o ( "The rendered f i l e has been saved in the f i l e ’ {0} ’ . " . format ( render_f i lename ) )
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502 # Use command l i n e to debug long execut ing drawings :
#dot −Tpdf −Gnsl imit=1000 k−18−n−3. topology . dot −v −O
504
i f exportGexf :
506 gexf_f i lename = " {} . gex f " . format ( output_fi lename )
xml_ugly = et . t o s t r i n g ( root_node , encoding=’UTF−8 ’ , method=’xml ’ )
508 xml = md. pa r s eS t r ing ( xml_ugly )
with open ( gexf_fi lename , "w" ) as f :
510 f . wr i t e ( xml . toprettyxml ( indent=" " , newl="\n" , encoding=’UTF−8 ’ ) )
512 LOG. i n f o ( "The gex f f i l e has been saved in the f i l e ’ {0} ’ . " . format ( gexf_f i lename ) )
LOG. i n f o ( "\ n I f you want to generate a b e au t i f u l graph with Gephi , f o l l ow the f o l l ow ing
s t ep s : \ n"
514 " 1 . Load the f i l e ’{0} ’ in Gephi . \ n"
" 2 . Go to the ’ Overview ’ tab and choose a placement layout ( I l i k e the r e s u l t s
o f ’ ForceAtlas 2 ’ a lgor i thm ) . \ n"
516 " 3 . Tune as needed and run the layout un t i l you are s a t i s f i e d with the
placement and pre s s stop . \ n"
" 4 . Go to the ’ Preview ’ tab and pre s s the ’ Refresh ’ button . \ n"
518 " 5 . Under the ’ Edges ’ group , unt ick the ’ Curved ’ t i c k box and change the ’ Color
’ o f the edges from ’mixed ’ to ’ o r i g i n a l ’\n"
" 6 . Choose a ’ b lack ’ background i f you used the ’−−optimized−for−black−bg (−o ) ’
option , and pre s s a f i n a l r e f r e s h . \ n"
520 " 7 . Once you are s a t i s f i e d with the r e su l t , p r e s s the ’ Export SVG/PDF/PNG’
button to save the layout . \ n" . format ( gexf_f i lename ) )
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